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Forward
The organizational learning history you are about to read emerges
from a unique collaboration among practitioners, academicians and
product development professionals. It is an important document
because it lays out the dilemmas, paradoxes, and human emotions
associated with teamwork in today's complex organizations. Our
future will most certainly depend on how well we learn to manage
conflicting needs in large systems.
This study is more about learning how to learn, than about the
nuts and bolts associated with designing and building great
automobiles. More often than not you'll conclude it's not about
who is right or wrong, but about a world of perception and
interpretation. For me, this is a human story because it reveals
how different attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions rise to the
surface, and may rule the day.
What's especially revealing is how the product development
function is demystified as an exact science of equations,
engineering procedures, and computer-driven technology. Instead,
you'll find dedicated people at all levels relentlessly seeking
alignment, recognition, and assurances that the day's effort will
yield value-added results over chaos and self-interest. This
dedication also requires a balanced perspective. We can be
extremely efficient by way of quality, cost, timing, and
flexibility. But, these objectives must be in service to the
customer. Outstanding teams of the future will need to balance
multiple initiatives more than ever before.
For me, this learning history is about a beginning, not an end.
We are building on what we've learned with this first MIT effort
by applying the methods and tools in two other vehicle programs.
Additionally, there are many organizational learning projects
going on in the Company outside of product development. Perhaps
this will enable us to see the connections among all these efforts
and move to yet another new level of understanding.
Senior Vice President - Product Development
AutoCo
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Executive Overview
This is the story of a group of 300 people, the Epsilon program team, charged with
meeting the typical "tight" deadlines to get a vehicle out the door. They resolved to do it
without the costly, hectic, last-minute "heroic" efforts that had dominated most
automobile launches in the past. They discovered, along the way, that this meant not just
developing new management techniques and a "systemic" understanding of their work,
but recreating their relationships with one another and with the rest of the company.
It is also the story of a particular type of partnership, between managers in Epsilon and
researchers from the MIT Center for Organizational Learning. The project from which
this learning history is drawn began in the summer of 1991, when senior managers from
Epsilon and MIT researchers agreed to explore how Epsilon might incorporate tools for
systems thinking, improving mental models, and nurturing personal and shared vision
into its product development process. The particular approach (written about by Peter
Senge in The Fifth Discipline) used to deepen and accelerate team learning is a synthesis
of individual approaches that evolved from more than twenty years of research at MIT,
Harvard and elsewhere. Elements had been applied within consulting practice, yet it had
never been "tested" in a multi-year, practical work setting. The researchers envisioned
creating "managerial practice fields" to enable people working together to periodically
step back, reflect, talk together, and thereby deepen their understanding of the systemic
nature of pressing problems. They hoped to establish practice fields that would serve
Epsilon's managers' desire to improve cost, timing, and quality and allow them to study
how practicing managers developed new collective learning capabilties.
The AutoCo Learning History is one outcome of that study. It is a jointly-told tale by the
participants and the researchers. In writing the learning history, we were asked by
AutoCo to summarize what was learned. We suggest managers at AutoCo and elsewhere
consider the following four lessons:
* The combined impact of the learning tools and committed managers willing to
genuinely learn and grow can lead to significant enhancements in local business
results. The Epsilon team met or exceeded many product development timing records
at AutoCo and produced a vehicle with a top quality rating. In its first year of release
it bettered quality ratings of the car it replaced, unusual for a new model year.
* New types of interrelationships, attitudes, and thinking can't just be decreed. They
must be allowed to grow. There is no substitute for individual responsibility in
learning. Senior managers can help most by giving people room to experiment within
the constraints necessary to deliver the program, and by striving to serve as examples
for the behavior they're trying to produce.
* With a modicum of specific attention to "building better conversations," a flood of
innovation poured forth. Managing the "softest" aspect of the team - the ways people
thought and communicated together - gave the highest leverage for improving "hard"
results.
* Having a great team is not enough, even when that team has as many as 1000 full-time
equivalent people. The relationship between the team and the larger organization is
crucial. The team learned and performed together, yet its ability to diffuse what it
learned and impact the larger organization is an open question. Diffusing learning
requires extraordinary efforts on the part of team leaders to help executives to
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understand new workplace innovations. It requires extra attention (for example, the
willingness to talk through potential misunderstandings, or to make themselves
available for each other "beyond the call of duty") because innovations can easily be
misunderstood. Executives have managerial accountability for the team's business
performance -- performance that they fear might be compromised when they don't
understand the new practices.
However, merely stating such lessons sheds little if any light on how the team actually
developed the capability to achieve these results and how they still managed to run into
problems.
That's why even a busy manager or executive might find it useful to read the eighty-page
historical account of another group's change effort. By seeing the struggles, doubts,
misunderstandings, and varied points of view of the Epsilon project, as told in
participants' own words, you might get a sense of what would be necessary to promote
increased learning capabilities in your own projects. What worked for Epsilon cannot be
readily applied to different groups and different contexts, but there are insights that we
think can help other teams: an appreciation of how new learning tools and processes are
actually used in practice, and what it means personally for people to develop systems
thinking and mental models skills. Does the law of physics - that for every action there
is an equal and opposite reaction - apply to social systems? Was it Epsilon's workplace
innovations that released larger organizational forces?
What would another team need to repeat Epsilon's success - and avoid its failures - in
the future? We believe the learning history shows that a significant success factor was
this: Epsilon's leaders designed their work as a learning process. Reading the learning
history, you will see a sense of humility and mutual engagement at work. Team members
recognized that they had endemic problems which went beyond strict engineering issues,
into issues of organizational communication. They also recognized that no one on the
team had all the answers. Answers would have to emerge from the give-and-take between
members of the team. They invested time and money in "learning labs," a "learning
room," and "harmony bucks," as ways to bring people together regularly to work out
critical design and team issues in an atmosphere of systemic understanding and dialogue.
Through many such actions they established a sense that, "We're all in it together,
because we are all connected together." The learning history also shows, by contrast,
their inability to create a comparable learning orientation in dealing with upper
management, perhaps because they never had the partnership of upper management in the
first place. How to build effective learning partnerships across hierarchical levels has
now become a central question for managers and researchers alike.
Organizational learning is a process of collective sense-making. You don't just produce
results; you produce a "theory of how you got there." If Epsilon's participants seem
uncommonly reflective for auto engineers, that is not merely a result of the learning
history effort, which asked them to look backward. It also stemmed from what they
learned as a team, and also, arguably, from the new atmosphere they created at Epsilon.
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Themes of the Epsilon Learning History
The AutoCo learning history is organized around six themes. These themes present the
important areas for describing and explaining the Epsilon program's achievements (see
"Noticeable Results" on page 84) and include materials which provide a chronology of
the three-year project (also see project timeline on page xiii).
O Hard results, soft concerns. When managers pay attention to human issues like
openness and fostering trust, would teams be able to produce better business results? In
Epsilon, the focus on how managers think and interact started with nine months of
working sessions in a cross-functional leadership team composed of most of the senior
functional managers in the Epsilon program. These sessions aimed to foster shared vision
and shared understanding of one another's mental models in the context of addressing the
program's practical problems. Thus, the senior team management began the learning
process long before the rest of the team, which enabled them to jointly design the evolution
of the process.
e Setting an example of non-authoritarian leadership. Many experts and
consultants preach the need for a more non-authoritarian and participative approach to
project leadership but can offer little help in how to develop and sustain such behavior. In
Epsilon, this philosophy became reality as project leaders' behavior changed over time as
a by-product of the tools and learning processes employed. For senior leaders, "walking
the talk" is not a trivial matter. It requires concerted effort and mutual partnership. And it
can make a huge difference.
Introductory Learning Labs: Teaching techniques for thinking differently.
Eventually, a two-day "learning lab," taught by program managers and MIT staff, was
created to introduce many members of the Epsilon team to the learning tools and methods
with which the leadership team had been working. "Learning labs" may include a variety
of techniques, but the key goal is inviting more in-depth conversation across functional
boundaries, enabling people to focus on key business-related issues in a risk-free setting
accessible to all.
0 Combining engineering innovations with human relations: The Harmony
Buck. Combining new technical ideas with greater trust and new interpersonal skills (a
"human relations" approach) can enable people to apply the technical ideas more
effectively. The "Harmony Buck" speeded up prototyping by allowing people to come
together and try out new engineering solutions. But it also built on the growing
environment of involvement and openness and in turn contributed to that environment.
The result was an increased flow of information among team members testing their ideas
together.
* Partnerships. Functionally based people were drawn together in ways that bridged
differences and focused on collaborative learning and action. An atmosphere which
encourages experimentation across traditional boundaries leads to benefits that the senior
leaders can't necessarily predict or plan for.
§ Process innovation in the context of a large organization. Eventually, local
process innovations are brought into larger management forums. The larger AutoCo
organization responded to the Epsilon team in many ways, not always in ways Epsilon's
members would have wished for. Innovative local line leaders often put their faith in
proving that their innovations will lead to better business results, and that these results will
bring credibility to their efforts. This assumption proved faulty for Epsilon's managers.
Lacking senior management partners, they also lacked counsel on how to handle the larger
system implications of their efforts.
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The leaders of the Epsilon Program worked to change how they worked together first.
Only then did they encourage other people to change their styles. Although use of
learning tools and the learning labs created means to support new skills and new
behaviors, we of the learning history team heard again and again that the changes in
senior managers' personal behavior was the critical force. This change in behavior among
the Epsilon team leaders allowed others on the team to change, be more open, and share
their difficulties and mistakes rather than avoid embarrassing situations. That openness,
in turn, gave Epsilon its capability for quality, its flexibility, and its inspiring atmosphere.
It is the goal of this learning history not only to document the experiences of an
innovative team, but to provide a springboard other teams can use to learn from Epsilon's
experience. Learning from others' experience is not easy. Simple lists of "lessons-
learned" or technical tips might help, but they rarely provide insight into the process
whereby innovation occurs or how it actually "feels" for the participants. On the other
hand, if nothing is conceptualized and communicated, knowledge remains "tacit," below
the surface, and can only be learned by direct contact with the innovators -- an inefficient
process for diffusing innovative practices within an organization and an impossible one
for those outside the organization. Learning from the Epsilon Team's efforts starts with
appreciating the tools and methods they used, brief descriptions of which are included
below (with references to more detailed descriptions). What this learning history adds is
the story of what was done when, how it affected people, what those people
accomplished, and the individual and collective challenges of deep learning. It is our
hope that this learning history can stimulate inquiry and conversations in other teams,
enabling them to discover their own commitments, questions, and tacit knowledge. To
help, some initial questions to be considered and discussed after reading this history, are
included in the "Appendix" on page 86.
The story which follows begins when executives gave final approval for Epsilon's
development budget, in which styling, market positioning, and expenditures were set.
The program was already many weeks behind schedule. At the same time, "process
improvement" as an endeavor was beginning to gain importance and attention at AutoCo.
Making a great car wasn't enough; you also had to improve AutoCo's process
capabilities.
Seeking a better process for developing vehicles, the Epsilon researchers explored tools
and techniques gleaned from the work of MIT's Center for Organizational Learning.
They integrated program management and training, so that all work on the car could
involve systems thinking and collaboration. Early efforts were focused on bridging the
barriers between functions: creating a shared vision of the new vehicle, collocating
engineers in one large multi-functional building, and bringing design engineers into the
market research process at an early stage. As the team progressed, its vehicle
development metrics went from low initial scores to setting new company records for
prototype-build parts availability and quality.
The Epsilon program completed its assignment at the end of 1994. The vehicle launch,
which took place a week earlier than scheduled, was truly a "non-event," without the
crisis atmosphere that normally leads to legions of engineers camping out at the
manufacturing plant. However, the Epsilon results also included controversy. The launch
coincided with organizational changes at AutoCo, in which Epsilon team leaders did not
EPSILON Learning History Executive Overview (revised 10/96) Page vi
receive accolades for their accomplishments. As team members were assigned to new
positions, some wondered if their efforts were valued or appreciated. Yes, they had
broken performance records; but they had also broken some behavioral norms. For
example, reports of problems had been deliberately brought to the surface earlier than
usual. This had saved money and improved quality in the long run, but had also led to the
appearance that the Epsilon program was "out of control." We propose that as readers,
you consider what lessons from Epsilon's experience you can apply to create and sustain
an atmosphere which encourages experimentation and learning while producing better
business results.
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Preface
This document is a learning history of collaborative efforts undertaken by AutoCo and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management Center for
Organizational Learning. These efforts took place between 1991 and 1994 on the Epsilon
vehicle development program. The project's objective was: To develop and study learning
capabilities in a product development team of more than 300 people, while having a positive
impact on business results. The purpose of this document is to report on those efforts and
create materials from which other interested teams might learn.
The name of the company, AutoCo, is a pseudonym for an automobile company. Epsilon is
also a fictional project name, as are all other formal names used in this document. People in
the learning history are identified only by their titles. The company, program, and people are
disguised to provide anonymity, protect AutoCo's need for confidentiality, minimize
distraction and help the reader to focus his or her attention on the universal themes herein.
This document was written by a small "learning historian" team composed of people from
AutoCo and from MIT. We developed the learning history in the hope that it could help other
teams and individuals at AutoCo, and other companies, to benefit from this program's
experience.
A learning history is a new format for presenting the story of a project. It is designed to
portray the project as participants experienced it, and to invite readers to draw their own
conclusions. In this history we make the "sense-making process" visible - we report not
just what people did, but how they interpreted events around them and what reasoning led to
their decisions. To gather this information, we interviewed over fifty individuals. The
interviewees included engineers, process leaders, content leaders (see Sidebar: "Content
leaders" and "process leaders" page 15), and managers at all levels and functions within the
Epsilon team, along with suppliers, engineers from other functions, senior AutoCo
management, and other key figures at AutoCo. We also reviewed transcripts of meetings,
interviews, program documents, and speeches given by key participants during the program.
People's perspectives and attitudes varied; we have made an explicit effort to include as wide
a range of points of view as possible.'
The value of this document depends on the conversation it generates: How can AutoCo's
Epsilon experience provide a useful example for your team or project? We ask readers to
suspend their assumptions - about automobile companies, management, engineering, and
all other aspects of vehicle production - so that they can focus on what happened, how
people described events, how they felt and what their attributions were.
The learning history report starts with an overview, and then there is a chapter describing the
origins of the Epsilon learning effort. (The critical events and observable measures which
provide data on how the Epsilon program progressed, "Noticeable Results" are listed at the
The learning history team used a grounded theory, qualitative data analysis methodology to discern
key concepts and patterns. See Strauss, 1987, Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists; Corbin and
Strauss, 1990, Basics of Qualitative Research; Miles and Huberman, 1994, Qualitative Data Analysis,
and Glaser and Strauss, 1967, The Discovery of Grounded Theory. In analyzing of large quantities of
qualitative data with a team of inside and outside learning historians, we have found it helpful to think
in terms of meeting three "imperatives"-- research (loyalty to the "data"), mythic (loyalty to the
"story"), and pragmatic (loyalty to the audience's needs). Each of these imperatives represents a set
of "pure" priorities - all important, and all in contention with each other. They can't be approached
simultaneously. They are attended to in sequence, but there must be deliberate, balanced
consideration of all three, in every phase of a learning history effort.
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end of this document, on page 87.) The subsequent sections represent themes - key
concepts which represent the underlying significance of this project, and which emerged
from a close reading and examination of the materials collected in our research. We present
each of these themes in the form of a "jointly-told tale," separating the researchers' comments
from participants' narrative. There are four different types of material in these "jointly-told
tales:"
* The right-hand column of text, within each theme, tells the story in the words of key
participants, taken directly from the "primary data" of interviews, speeches and
meetings. (Each participant has seen, and approved, his or her quotations.)
* The left-hand column of text provides interpretive and synthesizing material: questions,
analysis, generalizations, and implications, developed by the learning historians to help
readers begin to apply the material to their own situation.
* There are also full-column passages which introduce topics, provide context, and set
the stage.
* Finally, boxed "sidebars" provide background information on methods, tools and key
topics, referred to in the text, which would otherwise distract you from the narrative.
In reading the two column format of the "jointly-told" tale sections, you will find yourself
having to make a choice. Which column do you read first? Do you skip back and forth, and
when do you do so? There are no "rules" for reading a learning history; different people read
segments in different orders. As you make your way through the story, however, please pay
attention to your own reactions. How credible do you find the story? How would you have
dealt with the problems that faced the Epsilon team? How can their experience help inform
the decisions that you (and your associates) have to make in the future? It is through the
discussion and dialogue with colleagues, about the contents of this document, that we believe
your own and your team's learning will best be served.
AutoCo Epsilon Learning History Team
Five internal AutoCo team members
George Roth & Art Kleiner
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Chronology
Epsilon's learning program conception
Mechanical Prototype Build (8/91)
Three-day Offsite at Splendido Hotel (10/91)
Team Collocation (10/91)
Market Research Clinic (4/92)
Harmony Buck Completed (1/93)
Evaluation Prototype (EP) Build (4/93)
Change Requests (CR's) reach 500 (7/93)
Validation Prototype (VP) Build (10/93)
CR's reduced from 350 to 50 (3/94)
Accelerated 1 PP Build (6/94)
1980's
I
IAutoCo's interest in systems thinking
1991
MIT Project Engagement Clinic (9/91)
1992
Core team meetings begin (1/92)
Core team system map (8/92)
1st Learning Lab (9/92)
1993
2nd Learning Lab (2/93)
3rd Learning Lab (5/93)
4th Learning Lab (8/93)
1994
Job One Build (111/94)
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Origins of Epsilon's Learning Project
AutoCo's interest in systems thinking (which later included organizational learning)
began in 1989, when Peter Senge (who was developing a Center for Organizational
Learning based at MIT) and Russell Ackoff (professor emeritus at the University of
Pennsylvania's Wharton School) started giving monthly presentations in AutoCo's
Executive Development seminars. A manager in AutoCo University [AU Manager],
who sponsored the monthly training sessions, was interested in testing these
systems thinking concepts in one or more live business settings at AutoCo.
Note how seeds were sown for some time
before a project opportunity emerged at
AutoCo. The company "pulled" the effort
in, rather than being "sold" a bill of goods.
As at other large companies, AutoCo
internal "change agents" had to consciously
decide between a "bottom-up" or "top-
down" approach in any given initiative.
From the beginning, this effort took the
"bottom-up" approach. This meant it would
be easier to implement, but harder to
expand to fit the larger AutoCo system.
Note how this very concrete learning effort
begins with three abstract "governing
ideas. " It's not clear to outsiders whether a
concept like "thinking differently" meant
the same thing to different AutoCo
managers and executives.
AutoCo called upon well known academics
and consultants as part of an education
program for
senior managers. Each issue had its own
leading "expert, " with the exception of
systems thinking, which had two strong
voices: Peter Senge and Russell Ackoff.
These two experts held, in common, the
view that an organization's work could not
be understood in fragments. AutoCo's
managers responded to this message
AU Manager: We had just finished our
first executive education program for
the top 2000 people worldwide. It
was a gathering from the four corners
of the world, and it was quite a
happening. The question was, what
should be in the second round?
We decided on a "bubble-up" rather
than "top-down" model. We went around
the world and interviewed executives
and asked them what was on their
minds. What would be of the greatest
interest to them? Three issues
surfaced: globalization, thinking
differently and leadership.
Underlying the first two issues
was the pervasive issue of change.
We then went about exploring what
would be a senior executive program
built around these three themes.
There was controversy in presenting
them to the top of the house because
the top felt they might not be ready
to get into all this subject matter.
Nevertheless, they said, "press
forward."
In the arena of "thinking
differently," we came across two
outstanding voices: Peter Senge and
Russ Ackoff. The more we dug into the
area, the more we found a very
significant message coming out of
Senge's and Ackoff's world views.
By late 1989, early 1990, we had
both Senge and Ackoff doing a program
at our center every other week. In
our analysis of participants'
EPSILON Learning History * Origins of Learning Project Page: 
1
ILON earning istory Origins of Learning Project Page: 1
because it helped with the perennial
problem of miscommunication and conflict
between functions.
Intellectually thought provoking and
personally compelling, but very abstract,
the ideas in systems thinking were flavored
by their academic origins. AutoCo
managers were intrigued but they
challenged the academic stance by asking,
"How are these abstract concepts applied?
The A U Manager took the response of
senior executives as a challenge to find a
way to operationalize systems thinking
throughout AutoCo.
The comments people asked about
application led to their being critically
challenged.
Is it possible for executives who have
spent their lives thinking in a particular
way to change their thinking?
reactions, there was a large voice
saying, "The ideas are intriguing,
but I don't see how I would play them
out in my ballpark - on Monday
morning!"
In all fairness, we had asked both
Senge and Ackoff to take us on a
broad journey, and not to focus
specifically on application. It's
not surprising that participants were
intrigued with it, and saw its depth,
but they were right in feeling that
there needed to be an ability to see
further down that chain of, "What
happens next?"
That's when I formulated the
challenge for myself and AutoCo
University to continue to pursue this
subject area. I had the good fortune
to be able to sit in on numerous
sessions with Peter and Russ, and in
the fifth or sixth session, the ball
bearings started to rotate in unison.
I asked Ackoff publicly, "Russ,
I've been sitting here for several
sessions, it's an outstanding
message, but I'm still having trouble
digesting it and its implications."
Russ turned to me and said, "Well,
that's because you'll never get it."
I turned beet red. Here I was
standing in front of 50 executives,
and the room was dead silent. Then
Russ let me off the hook. He turned
to the group, and said, "And you
won't get it, either. We have built
up over 400 years of methodology of
'reductionist' thinking. It is so
powerful, so pervasive, that probably
your children and their children will
have a much easier time. For you
folks, it's going to be tough grind."
Down to my socks, I understood
that you can say you understand it,
and still not understand it. The
implications were absolutely
profound. Organizational learning
didn't mean letting go of analytical
processes. It meant complementing and
supplementing them with synthesis or
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systems thinking. It's not such a
clean thing - "Just throw out all the
traditional tools, my past life - and
switch into new formulas." It means
learning something in addition: the
"and," not the or."
AutoCo's introduction to systems thinking thus represented a challenge: How could
the organization make use of systems thinking in a business context?
In 1991 a diverse group of AutoCo managers attended a series of five two-day
training sessions on the core competencies of a learning organization run by the
founding staff from the Center for Organizational Learning. To the surprise of the
AU manager, given the abstract nature of the materials, the first audience exposed
to the concepts was receptive. This audience was composed, in part, of managers
from product development. In particular, the Epsilon Program Launch Manager
expressed keen interest. He was responsible for the vehicle development program
to design and build the next model of the Epsilon luxury car.
Past experiences in developing cars were
powerful influences in trying to create a
better approach on the Epsilon program.
Although good quality and timely
delivery are held up as critical, achieving
them does not make cost overruns
acceptable.
This is not the only example where
attributing good performance to team
dynamics was not accepted as a
convincing explanation by executives. It
seemed that executives expected and
listenedfor technical innovation, rather
than management changes.
Do the ways in which success is achieved
in large corporations have to have task
oriented, replicable type answers to be
accepted?
Launch manager: I had worked on the
Delta program [another vehicle
program] for several years as the
Business Planner and Launch Manager.
We had discovered, a year before Job
One, that the program was 17 months
behind schedule. So we quickly
organized a 100-person launch team and
we put the program back on schedule,
with quality that was better than the
first car. We met all of our program
objectives except cost, which we knew
from the beginning we could not meet.
I remember a meeting where a Vice
President listened to us present the
reasons for our success [on the Delta
program]: team leadership, and the
fact that everyone had the same goals
and knew that they depended on each
other. "That sounds really great," he
said, "but what did you do?" He
finally said it must have been a
fluke, and that was the end of it.
There was no learning from the
experience. It bothered me a great
deal. AutoCo is in love with managing
by crisis; without a crisis, we don't
know what to do. I resolved to learn
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how to produce a car launch without a
crisis.
In July 1991, the AU Manager, along with an internal consultant working with the
Launch Manager, wrote a letter to Peter Senge, director of the MIT Center for
Organizational Learning. They requested an active relationship between MIT
researchers and the Epsilon Program.
Project Engagement Clinic
The formal partnership between the two organizations started with a project
"engagement" clinic in September, 1991. The goal of this clinic was to engage one
another in asking difficult questions about readiness for learning, and explore
possibilities for a partnership which sought business improvements and research
results. Attending the meeting were the key people in the project - the Program
Manager, Launch Manager, and Body Engineering Manager for the Epsilon
Program, two internal consultants on process improvement (who were to integrate
systems thinking at AutoCo) and five researchers associated with the MIT Center
for Organizational Learning. One researcher had visited AutoCo and conducted
interviews in advance.
These interviews were summarized in a report that singled out several key issues:
* The Launch Manager wanted the MIT project to focus on improvements in
the Evaluation Prototype [EP]. If the EP could be made to "work" as it
should, the car would be successful, he said. He wanted to create a
climate within the team which reinforced more effective cross-functional
communication, more responsibility for objectives, and less "games-
playing."
* The Epsilon Program Manager (the Launch Manager's boss, with overall
responsibility for the Epsilon project) believed that concentrating on one
prototype, like the EP, was too narrow. He felt it was necessary to look at
AutoCo's product development paradigm. Present product development
management practices controlled resources ineffectively, treated suppliers
with indifference or hostility, and had a history of not achieving quality,
cost and time objectives. The Program Manager mentioned the inability of
a program to reach a point where management could say, "Enough
changes this time."
* AutoCo's vehicle program management needed to see tangible
improvement. The new product development program officially involved
a 48-month time period, which was compressed to 42 months, and had
very ambitious deadlines. Chronic dependency on "heroic" efforts took
key people away from the planned product development process. Some
people felt certain that it was just a question of time before a real crisis
became obvious.
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* MIT's researchers wanted the project to further the investigations being
done in the Center for Organizational Learning. Supporting research
would require more than a relationship where MIT played the role of
expert consultant and AutoCo took the role of client. Instead, both
organizations would have to collaborate in a systemic approach to
improving the product development management practices and
understanding the results that were achieved. Measurement would be
important in determining if improvements occurred over time.
Following the project engagement clinic, several meetings were held to determine
the project focus and how MIT researchers would work with the Epsilon team. In
January of 1992, a core "learning team" of managers from the Epsilon program
began meeting regularly, at one- or two-month intervals. The core "learning team"
consisted of ten Epsilon managers (including the Program Manager, Launch
Manager, Assembly Manager, Finance Manager, Body Engineering Manager, and
Purchasing Manager, and two internal consultants). The lead MIT Researcher was
present as a facilitator. These meetings provided opportunities to plan, learn
techniques and tools that facilitated learning, and practice using those techniques
between meetings.
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Sidebar: What are "learning laboratories?
"Learning laboratory" is a term
used by the MIT Center for
Organizational Learning for a
workshop, often also called a
"managerial practice field,"
where people come to develop
new skills, cycling back and
forth between study and
practice.
Actobn
Actbn
lcton
Relotlon
RAl~#lo
The learning lab is different
from a training session in that
over time its concepts and
values are intended to become
part of, to be integrated into,
work issues and job settings.
In sports, the arts, and the
military, teams are accustomed
to practice sessions, simulating
real events where members learn
from mistakes and each others'
examples. Similarly, learning
labs simulate normal business
settings, providing an
opportunity for management
teams to practice together and
make mistakes without penalty
or the pressures of performance.
Participants learn new tools by
applying them to the issues
they face in their day-to-day
jobs. The MIT-COL learning
labs at AutoCo focused on skills
of conversation, reflection, and
systems thinking.
The two-day learning labs at
AutoCo were designed and
facilitated by Dan Kim from the
Center for Organizational
Learning and selected managers
from the Epsilon program team.
The Launch Manager was the
first AutoCo facilitator, and he
was directly involved in all the
learning labs.
The designs were based on the
experiences of the first core
team, and modified after each
session in light of the experience
of new labs, the makeup of
participants, and new issues faced
by the program. Some
participants in early labs became
facilitators of later labs. Four
learning labs were run during the
program. Over 100 people -
more than a third of the full-time,
dedicated engineers on the
program - attended.
The learning labs at AutoCo
alternated between conceptual
sessions for learning new tools
(of conversation and systemic
thinking) and exercises for
practicing their use. These
exercises were deliberately
designed so that people could
consider their own work issues
with perspective that came from
the deliberate telescoping of time
and space. For example, a
computer simulation allowed
participants to spend an
afternoon working together
through a product development
process that would normally have
required three to four years.
For more about the learning labs at Epsilon, see Theme 3: Learning labs: Teaching techniques for
thinking differently, page 35. For theoretical information on designing managerial practice fields and
learning labs see Kim and Senge, "Putting Systems Thinking into Practice" in System Dynamics Review,
1994, Vol. 10, Nos. 2-3, pp. 277-290.
After meeting for eight months, the core learning team designed a series of learning
laboratories, through which engineers on the program were to learn and apply
techniques of systems thinking, working with mental models, and team learning.
Those learning laboratories took place in September of 1992 and February, May
and August of 1993. The efforts of the Epsilon program to apply organizational
learning concepts spanned the following three years.
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Theme 1: Hard results, soft concerns
When the Program Manager was appointed as manager of the Epsilon program his
ambition was to develop an excellent vehicle and a process which valued and
inspired people on the team. This section describes the challenge facing Epsilon: To
achieve "hard" results (producing high-quality technical parts, sub-assemblies, and
a complete vehicle efficiently) through an emphasis on concepts that many people
termed "soft" (good communication, openness, honesty and trust.)
Learning in the core team (Jan. 1992 - Sept. 1992)
The core "learning" team began with an awareness that they faced "real internal
conflicts." The Epsilon program was unofficially expected to be a "Lexus-fighter at
the price of an [American luxury car]," although as a front-wheel drive car with its
planned variable costs, it would be difficult to compete with the Lexus.
The core team members all felt a high level of frustration, and a sense of urgency,
since the program was already late. They recognized the dilemma of being a pilot
learning project; they could already see that their effort might mean "taking on"
AutoCo's overarching culture. This culture included a strong reliance on hierarchy
and functional authority - an expectation that the boss is on top of technical details
and makes decisions. On top of that, the core team members had difficulty
communicating with each other. "I couldn't talk to [the Finance Manager] at first,"
the Program Manager noted, "in less than a high-decibel range."
At the beginning of 1992, the core team met every one or two months, working
with a variety of communication and conceptualization techniques such as the ladder
of inference, the left-hand column, role-playing, and system mapping (see sidebars
Sidebar: What are systems archetypes?
The systems thinking process
involves building new
collaborative understandings of
the interplay of forces at work.
To accomplish this,
participants use "archetypes:"
images of common systemic
situations. Each of these
patterns occurs in a wide variety
of domains, from ecology to
economics to manufacturing;
each offers its own strategic
insights, and gives people a
better picture of how the forces
of the system may trap them.
System dynamics researchers
have published descriptions of
about a dozen archetypes. They
include "Limits to Growth," in
which a seemingly boundless
growth pattern runs up against
unexpected limiting forces.
(Total quality campaigns, for
example, run up against
institutional disappointment
after the "low-hanging fruit" is
picked.) In another archetype,
"Shifting the Burden," a more
immediately inviting, short-
term solution to a problem
weakens the system's ability to
develop a more fundamental, but
slower, approach.
Another archetype, the 'Tragedy
of the Commons," became the
basis for the Epsilon team's
"Tragedy of the Power Supply"
(described later).
Compared to computer models of
systems, archetypes are
simplistic; they have been
compared to "training wheels."
But in well-designed group
workshops, they can lead to very
sophisticated collective
understandings of common
problems. Because archetypes
imply counter-intuitive, but
effective, alternatives for action,
they are generally very useful
strategic tools.
See Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline (1990; Doubleday), p. 93-113 and 378-390; Daniel H. Kim, Systems
Archetypes: Diagnosing Systemic Issues and Designing High-Leverage Interventions (1993, Pegasus
Communications); and Senge et al, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook (1994, Doubleday), pages 121-150.
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on these pages). Their ability to communicate improved, and they began to focus in
on their most serious problems.
Sidebar: What are the "ladder of inference" and "left-hand column"?
These "action science" devices
are designed to build skills of
"reflection and inquiry:" ways of
holding conversation that lead
to greater understanding of both
process and content. The tools
are simple exercises and
metaphors that help people
unlearn their own defensive,
counter-productive
conversational habits. For
example, in many work
situations it's more effective to
systematically inquire into why
other people feel the way they
do, instead of trying to hammer
your own point home as
dramatically as possible.
The "ladder of inference" - a
term coined by Professor Chris
Argyris - is a metaphor that
shows how rapidly we can leap
to knee-jerk conclusions with
little data and no intermediate
thought process, as if rapidly
climbing up a ladder in our
minds. You start at the bottom
with the observable data, which
is so self-evident that it would
show up on a videotape recorder
(Larry has yawned at a meeting),
and within the space of a few
seconds, leap up to assumptions
(Larry is bored), to more generic
conclusions (Larry doesn't care
about this project). Since most
of these conclusions are never
discussed openly, there is no
way to check them.
Thus, incorporating the "ladder"
into everyday conversation has
proven to be a pivotal
component of learning
organization work. It gives
people a safe way to raise and
check their varied interpretations
of events.
In the left-hand column exercise,
people select a difficult situation
and reconstruct a pivotal
conversation. In the right-hand
column, they write down what
was said. In the left, they
articulate what they were
thinking and feeling, but not
saying. The case becomes an
artifact through which people can
examine their own thinking, as
well as the systemic problems
which underlie the impasse.
I take: Actiols
nl (based on my beliefs) n The ladder of inference is
described in Chris Argyris,
Overcoming Organizational
Defenses, (1990, Prentice Hall,
p. 88-89); Argyris, Putnam, and
Diana McLain Smith, Action
Science, (1985, Jossey-Bass,
pp. 57-58). Also see The Fifth
Discipline Fieldbook, page 242.
The "left-hand column" exercise
is based upon the two-column
method developed by Chris
Argyris and Donald A. Sch6n.
The research method was first
presented in their book Theory in
Practice (1974, Jossey-Bass).
Also see The Fifth Discipline,
page 195, and The Fifth
Discipline Fieldbook, page 246.
L
To give them a broader perspective, several members of the core team interviewed a
dozen people from the rest of the Epsilon project, asking: What did people feel their
greatest challenges and strengths to be? The team returned for a working session in
ESILON L i .T 1
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March of 1992, ready to pick two or three problems and start fixing them
immediately.
The lead MIT Researcher reported his impressions of the team: bright people,
burdened with frustration and puzzlement but not resignation. The interpersonal
dynamics typical in a product development environment were evident in this
program.
The comments of the researcher were
typical of the ways managers from
different functional areas talked about and
reacted to one another in AutoCo.
Using tools to understand one another's
positions allowed people from different
functional backgrounds to work together
more productively.
The Learning Organization work assumed
that openness of communications, and
the willingness to address assumptions,
would lead to workplace efficiencies and
effectiveness. How valid is this
assumption?
If people could see issues from one
another's perspectives would it allow
them to work better together?
A sound logical argument was necessary
to convince the team to apply the tools
in the service of improving their abilities
Researcher: The participants had
locked horns and couldn't get
anywhere. [The Launch Manager] told me
much later in the process that [the
Program Manager] was ready to hang it
up after a few months. But he saw
enough value to keep him going. In one
critical incident, early in the
sessions, we used a ladder of
inference and left-hand/right-hand
column exercise to begin to look at
the ways in which finance and program
management couldn't communicate.
The exercises opened things up so
that they could really look at their
assumptions. Program management
revealed how they assumed that the
finance people "want to hold us to
[American automobile] costs."
Essentially, program management
thought that finance didn't have a
clue (and didn't care) about what it
took to build a car. "They just want
to meet the numbers."
The finance people showed their
assumptions about the program
managers: "These program guys don't
care about costs. They don't want to
work to get to the kind of car that we
said we were going to do. They won't
control costs."
I said, "Look, we're here to do
something different from the way you
continually do things." Instead of
having a normal "let's-solve-it" style
consulting project, I suggested that
we "try to understand our own
assessments of the problem. We are
blind to the limitations of our
assessments, and thus we can never see
what is really happening. Yet we
design solutions based on our own
individual assessments." The core team
members understood that argument, and
went along with another round of
EPSILON Learning History * Theme 1: Hard result, soft 
concerns Page 9
EPSILON Learning History Therne : Hard result, soft concerns Page 9
experimentation.
Tools from Total Quality Management
were used. A learning tool is one which
people share with one another to work
more effectively together. Learning tools
are spreadfreely to create shared insights,
not used by one person to gain an
understanding which he or she uses to
manipulate or change others.
See sidebar, next page. The "KJ diagram"
combines the intellectual-rational
thought process with intuitive-emotional
feeling data. It is generally used to
process a group's own thoughts and
observations; here, they used it to make
sense of their interviews.
The K.J. diagram incorporates multiple
people and multiple perspectives and
appeared to have brought to the surface
an interrelated and interdependent set of
problems.
The researcherfocused on problem
articulation rather than problem solution
(see Sidebar: Problem solutions, versus
problem articulation, page 14).
Are these three key issues important on
any product launch? Are they endemic to
the product development process? Do
they stem from AutoCo culture? Are
they worth taking time to deal with?
I had them break up into two groups
(because there were so many of us) and
each group did a K.J." We used the
technique to sort through the
information gathered from inter-
viewing Epsilon team members. "Listen
to what you think people are trying to
say," I said. "Get away from thinking
only rationally about the comments.
How do they feel to you?" We went
through a "scrubbing" process
[rewriting the statements to be
clear], then grouped them intuitively.
This is usually a very frustrating and
bewildering process, especially for an
engineering or action-oriented group,
because everything is interconnected
and diffuse.
Our theme question was, "What is
the biggest weakness with our product
development process?" And the
overarching answer that emerged had to
do with lack of trust and openness.
This was unspoken before this point,
and I think it wouldn't have been
captured otherwise.
Now they couldn't accuse me of
"making them" pay attention to this
trust issue. They had seen firsthand,
how it was at the core of their own
problems.
This incident made a lasting
impression on [the Program Manager],
and changed the dynamics of the
relationship with Finance, which was
very important.
Program Manager: There were really
only a few core issues. The rest of
the problems all generated from those.
* Fear and consequences of being wrong
led to people not sharing
information;
* The boss' need to control came at
the expense of drawing forth
individual capabilities on the team;
* Other people weren't trusted to help
you; they tended to one-up whatever
you did.
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By this point, we had been working
together eight months. We had learned
to generate trust in our own core
team, so we could look at these issues
and agree: "Yeah that's really what's
going on."
Sidebar: What are "affinity diagrams" (K.J.'s)?
Affinity diagrams ("K.J.'s"),
named for their inventor Jiro
Kawakita, emerged from the
quality movement in Japan. A
team of 5-10 people considers a
mass of issues, posts statements
related to a main question on a
wall, and repeatedly groups and
rephrases them.
Over the course of several hours,
a final pattern emerges: a
coherent set of themes that
reveal key underlying issues.
This illustration shows half of
the Epsilon team's final K.J.
arrangement. Each one of the
groupings represents a key
theme; the arrows show how
(the team felt) one theme
influenced another.
The diagram may look carefully
considered and well-organized,
but this final snapshot does not
show the hours of "messy,"
unfocused, frustrating
deliberations that went into it.
First by conducting interviews,
and then by using the "K.J."
process to sort and analyze that
data, the core team discovered a
critical issue: the extent to which
engineers trusted managers and
felt free to speak openly.
What are the weaknesses with the
product development process in Epsil on?
We don't know what we're doing so we
waste a lot of resources.
Management doesnot oonsider people
or human resources an asset.
Management requires reports as a way
of keeping aontrol.
EPILOl erigHsoy *Tee1 adrslt sotcnesPae1
EPSILON Learning History Theme : Hard result, soft concerns Page 11
Sidebar: Problem solutions, versus problem articulation
How do most people solve
problems in business settings?
When a problem is identified -
something is noticed as wrong
- action is required. Do
something, fix it! Under
conditions which are often
referred to as "fire, ready, aim,"
how often are managers able to,
or even expected to, think in
detailed ways? Detailed
thinking includes considering
multiple cause and affect
relationships as well as
unintended consequences. But
managers have neither time nor
training to think about
problems in this way. Thus,
solutions are often developed
and implemented before the
problem is understood.
Nonetheless, problems and
solutions are integrally
interconnected. Decision-
making researchers March and
Olsen ( "A Garbage Can Model
of Organizational Choice" in
Administrative Sciences
Quarterly, 1972 and "Garbage
Can Models of Decision Making
in Organizations" in
Ambiguity and Command,
Pitman Publishing, Inc. 1986)
have established the existence
of this connection at individual
and organizational levels.
Problem Solution
A "problem solving treadmill"
is created by problem solving in
this manner - solving one
problem will lead, in time, to
new problems. Technical types
of problems, working with
physical machines, for
example, are situations where
this type of rational problem
solving works well. As systems
.get more complex, however,
delays between problem and
solution mean that it is
increasingly difficult to link
actions and their consequences.
The "problem of problem-
solving" is exacerbated by the
fact that a problem's
identification depends, at least
in the short term, upon a
person's position and
perspective. For example, when
oil prices rose dramatically in
the mid and late '70's, this was a
dramatic "problem" for
consumers of oil and industries
dependent upon fossil fuels. But
it represented a windfall for
others - Middle Eastern
nations, oil producers,
alternative energy producers,
and even environmentalists
(because it led to energy-
efficiency research). Defining
something as a problem is an
interpretation of reality.
Thus, the way in which problems
are framed limits solutions.
Consider commonly heard
statements: The problem is...
"we need a better management
information system," "the reward
system needs to be revamped,"
"our costs are too high," "our
management philosophy is
outdated," or "we need a learning
orientation." These "problem
statements" limit the solutions
considered. More often than not,
the known solutions are applied
to the perceived problems. And,
when new problems emerge
related in part to previous
solutions, people fail to make
the connection. The problem
solving treadmill leads to a
condition which some define as
"insanity" - doing the same
thing over and over and
expecting different results!
Systems thinking provides an
alternative to the problem
solving treadmill. By
considering problems and
solutions as linked, solutions are
also evaluated on the basis of
potential unintended
consequences. Rather than
moving to action, the systems
thinking approach focuses on the
assumptions, or mental models,
from which the problems were
articulated in the first place.
For example, the identification
of potential solutions often
leads to an increased awareness
of problems. Since there is a
high likelihood of an
inappropriate fit between
problem and solution, new
unintended and unanticipated
consequences often erupt, in
part based on the mismatch
between solution and problem.
Problem Solution
delay
For more information in the "problem solving treadmill" concepts see
Daniel Kim's articles, "Using 'Fixes that Fail' to get off the problem-
solving treadmill" and "Fixes that Fail: Oiling the Squeaky Wheel-
Again and Again..." in the November 1990 and September 1992
editions of The Systems Thinker, Pegasus Communications,
Cambridge, Ma.)
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The system map (Learning Team Meeting, August, 1992)
Now the "core learning team" engaged in a "systems mapping" process, to connect
the concerns of trust and openness that had surfaced in the K.J. diagram with other
symptoms in product development,
parts.
See the next page for the core team's
view of "parts behind schedule."
Focusing on one key problem - in this
case lateness of parts - again showed the
interrelatedness and interdependencies of
all the problems facing the team.
The K.J. and causal loop diagrams appear
to have not only influenced how people
thought about the problems, but also
their perception of problem symptoms.
How can a team effectively build a group
understanding of a systemic issue, so all
members "own" that understanding?
This story of the finance manager's role
was often repeated to illustrate how the
system dynamics work is valuable to a
cross-functional team. Finance people
typically don't get involved in
engineering change processes; here, that
involvement helped build a deeper
understanding of systemic issues.
The researchers proposed that a shared
image of the system would allow people
to operate in a coordinated fashion.
such as the chronic critical problem of late
Program Manager: We weren't sure what
to do next. We didn't know how to
"change" fear or mistrust. So we
started to look at a key problem: Why
we were always late. No matter what we
did, no matter how we approached the
problem, parts were chronically behind
schedule. We began to share our views
about why. Over the course of a day,
we built up a diagram of the system.
When one engineer changes parts,
that part usually affects somebody
else. The "A" engineers can't start
part of their work until the "B"
engineers solve their problem. Parts
get late. This leads to pressure to
get back on schedule, so we compress
the supplier time. But then something
else would become late, because we
would be putting all our resources on
the part that was late. When parts get
so late that we can't recover, we
revise the build schedule. Then people
feel they have more time, so more
parts get late. Worse still, the next
time you have a build, people will
assume you're just going to revise the
schedule again, so they don't even try
to meet the dates.
We eventually got all this into a
complex chart. We all understood the
whole system as it related to us, and
we had all contributed to this map.
The map became critical. And the
person who pointed the key leverage
point wasn't an engineer, a
development manager, or a planning
manager. It was the finance manager.
She pointed out that just before the
"reporting of lateness," there's
usually a delay. The reason for the
delay is: people are afraid to be
criticized. There is a basic cultural
commandment in engineering - don't
tell someone you have a problem unless
you have the solution. You're supposed
EPSILON Learning History * Theue 1: Hard result, soft concerns 
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The hierarchical and autocratic
management culture at AutoCo reinforced
the engineering culture to limit
discussions of problems until there were
known solutions.
to solve it - and then tell them. But
during that delay, nobody knows about
the problem, and nobody can react.
That delay automatically compounds
delays in other loops going on through
the system.
The systems map was described by most
people as enormously useful. When a
group "sees the same picture, and comes
to the same conclusion, " is it the visual
(like the system map) that helps them
focus on issues systematically? Or is it
the conceptual link?
Program Manager: We all saw the same
picture, and we all came to the same
conclusion: This was a leverage point
for us. We began to look at how we
could structure the project to ease
that delay, and we concluded that our
real leverage was in improving the
communication process, improving
honesty, and improving trust.
We had begun to build these in the
core team, but they didn't exist
between the functional groups in the
rest of the team. But we knew that
building trust was possible, because,
after all, if we hadn't shared our
views of the system honestly, we would
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Sidebar: The core team's view of "parts behind schedule"
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This picture is a simplified version of a causal loop diagram produced by the
Epsilon core team. The key problem is the central concern, "parts behind schedule."
At the left are a series of forces (many involving exponential growth) that
contribute to increasing numbers of part changes and late decisions. At the right
are many of the "fixes" that the conventional system uses to "solve" the parts
behind schedule problem, and the unintended consequences of those fixes (staffing
shortfalls, the taking up of supplier time to help engineering) that actually make
the problem worse. Adapted from "A Framework and Methodology for Linking Individual
and Organizational Learning Applications in TQM and Product Development," by Daniel
H. Kim (1993, MIT Ph.D. dissertation, p. 282-296).
F
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never have gotten to this point.
Anotherfactor accelerating the decision
to promote open communication was the
increasing complexity of automotive
technology, particularly with fast-
changing subsystems such as the
electrical system. The better the team
became at working together, the better it
would deal with intricate components
which cut across two or more functional
roles.
Was the statement that "we don't know
how to make open communication work"
a barrier which kept people from
believing in the possibility of open
communication?
Program Manager: Only a small
[percentage] of the members of the
team actually worked for me, where I
could promote them and give them their
performance reviews. Most of them
worked for other functional
organizations - finance, assembly,
body engineering, climate control,
plastics. If I just pulled the team
together the normal way I would get
what we always get. People would
protect the objectives of their
organization. They would work on the
product, but their organization would
come first. My greatest leverage was
to make them view the other members of
the team as people with whom they had
a personal relationship. If I could
make them feel that they depended on
each other, and that they wanted to
help each other as people, that would
counterbalance the material reward
from their functional organization.
We had been talking about open,
honest communication around this
company for as long as I've been here
and I've been here 29 years now. We
don't know how to do it. This was the
first time I thought it might really
work.
Sidebar: "Content leaders" and "process leaders"?
On the Epsilon team, work attention focused on planning In this learning history, when
groups were organized around and coordination issues, and a the transcript refers to a "content
subsystems of the vehicle - "content leader," whose leader" or "process leader," it
electronic, interior/trim, attention focused on means one of these subsystem
powertrain, etc. Many of these engineering and technical team leaders. The learning
subsystem development teams concerns. history does not identify the
were assigned two managers: a particular subsystem in which a
"process leader," whose "content" or "process" leader
worked.
The transition to openness
Converting to an atmosphere of honesty and trust was an ongoing process, with
many setbacks, continuing throughout the forty-two month program.
Launch Manager: In one of our earliest
A premise of the learning organization is design reviews in February, 1991,
that the boss isn't the one with the folks were standing around saying,
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answers. Bosses are teachers and coaches
who help others learn and apply their
learning.
What model of teachers are they using?
Teachers of children? Or, teachers of
adults?
Manager's prerogative is typically that of
being the decision-maker. Making those
decisions was thought of as creating a
codependency between manager and
employee - employees look to
managers for decisions and managers
expect they make the decisions.
To the Program Manager and the Launch
Manager, "empowerment" meant the
recognition that engineers (and others on
the team) needed to make decisions and
feel responsible for those decisions.
The launch manager saw the group's
behavior as "dysfunctional. " But how
"functional" was it within the context of
the largerAutoCo culture?
Involving people in making decisions
implies that leaders make their reasoning
process explicit or, as in this case,
justify it as "reasonable. "
The behaviors associated with letting
people make their own decisions can
appear messy to outsiders - not the calm
where a boss calls the shots and all the
action occurs below the surface.
Why does there have to be a level of
"What do you want us to do?"
I said, "Wait a second. You're the
engineer. What do you think is the
right thing to do for the customer and
for the company? What is your
recommendation?"
They couldn't answer that question.
I realized then that this team needed
a lot of help. They were accustomed to
putting all the alternatives together
and the planning manager or Program
Manager would decide. I knew I had the
prerogative, based on my experience
and knowledge, to tell people what
should be done. But I told them I
would reserve that prerogative for
when I was willing to challenge them.
I didn't want to make decisions that
they should be making.
I realized over a period of time,
that AutoCo wanted to "empower" its
teams, but on this team, people didn't
feel empowered to do anything. That
was our first realization that this
was a dysfunctional group, probably
very typical of most groups.
Content leader: Every once in a while
we bosses have to grit our teeth and
swallow a decision that the team made,
even if we personally think, "Well I'd
rather not go on that path." If their
thinking is reasonable enough, and
they haven't missed any obvious
issues, then my objection is just a
matter of: "I would go the other way."
Launch Manager: A new project manager,
after sitting on a very typical
discussion, ran up to one of my team
leaders and said, "My God, your
program is a disaster. You're not
going to make it."
The team leader said, "No, this is
the way we always talk. Everything
that we know is thrown on the table.
We thrash about, and issues sound a
lot worse than they really are. This
is our way of sharing what's going
on."
The project manager said, "You've
got to be kidding me. If anybody had
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disaster before people will talk candidly? said anything remotely like that on
[my previous program], he would've
been killed. Problems would have to
reach a level of disaster before
people would ever talk candidly."
Engineer: Every day someone comes in
and says, "That was a really stupid
thing you said in that meeting the
other day. We all talked about it and
we think this..." I may say, "Yeah,
you guys are right," or maybe I don't
agree. But at least nobody has any
problem coming in and saying, "I don't
agree with what you said," or "Other
people think this," or "You didn't
think about that." And it helps.
These comments are typical of the Engineer: When an engineer goes on
remarks made by engineers about trust vacation we cover for him. We all work
and openness; they were gathered as one, which I think would be pretty
throughout the stages of the car project. unusual in most other jobs."
Engineer: You don't hear dialog like,
"People from body engineering are
dragging their feet," or "Those hard
noses from Assembly." We got that out
of the way up front. Now we can get
together and do the job.
Creating the atmosphere of trust and cooperation
Based on interview data, the following factors appear to be important in creating an
atmosphere which leads to trust and cooperation. These factors related to behaviors
which the core team sought to practice throughout the program. Each point is
described and illustrated in a section which follows.
· A mandate that "bearing bad tidings" would be safe;
* Ongoing sharing of information and perspective;
* A culture of greater inclusiveness;
* Deliberate encouragement of informality and friendship;
* A mindset that "no one has all the answers."
Other factors described elsewhere in the learning history also seem important:
· Leaders who modeled the desired behavior (see page 24);
· The conversational tools of the learning lab (see page 35);
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* Collocation* (see page 63).
A mandate that "bearing bad tidings" would be safe
The Epsilon leaders had to start by mandating that there would be no punishment
for candor, bringing in bad news, or raising uncomfortable questions.
How does a team effectively change its
culture from one that expects everyone to
"have the answers" to one that
encourages people to experiment and
raise issues before the answers are
certain?
This comment was one of many
illustrating how engineers came up with
and contributed new ideas because they
felt they would be heard.
Does admitting that as the boss you
don't know the answers help?
If the boss doesn't know an answer, how
would that evaluation affect the
engineers?
Content leader: If people know that
they're not going to get punished (for
taking risks), they'll try harder. We
had all kinds of ideas coming out of
the woodwork that people had been
keeping in their hip pockets. The net
we use for umbrella storage was an
idea of one of the engineers.
Engineers [on other projects]
don't generate ideas like that; they
wait for you to tell them what to do,
so if it screws up they can say it
wasn't their idea.
Team leader: [The Program Manager]
always gave us a strong feeling that
he wouldn't treat you like you were an
idiot if you didn't know the answer.
Or if you came to him for help, he
would try to help.
· Ongoing sharing of information and perspective
Taking the time to share information from different aspects of the development
process with a broad range of people appears to have created greater awareness of
program issues as a whole. Efforts were made for people to become aware of
everyone's role in light of the overall program goals.
One of the questions the managers
considered was whether taking the time
to share information broadly could be
made up by people working more
effectively together?
Could managers sharing more openly
Finance Manager: We had a better
understanding of why each of us does
what we do. This understanding was
helpful in the long term, because it
gave us a base of trust and
understanding. I think it started to
reduce people's sensitivities a little
bit. You understand why something
happened. If it wasn't necessarily
what you liked to happen, at least you
understood why.
Internal consultant: When a supplier
has a good relationship with the
engineers, the supplier will say
things like [for example], "You didn't
hear it from me, but something is
* "Colocation" means that people from the diverse engineering functions developing the car (i.e.
chassis design, air conditioning, suspension, alternator, sound systems, dashboard subsystems, etc.)
work from offices in the same location. Team members are physically placed together, during the
time it takes to design the car, instead of coming together only for formally scheduled meetings.
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result in others sharing their information
more openly, countering a larger cultural
tendency to hide problems?
going to be late and somebody's lying
to you. Don't tell anyone I told you."
A culture of greater inclusiveness
Including people, not just on the basis of who needs to know to do their job,
appears to have created an atmosphere where people were more aware of the whole
of what they were trying to achieve.
Team work was a much talked about
concept at AutoCo. However, there were
no common standards or definitions of
team work, and it was often managers
promoting their management style that
led to contests over who had created
effective teams.
Are new channels of communication,
such as including suppliers in internal
meetings, sufficient in themselves?
Could the time it took to broadly
disseminate information to a large group
of people be justified?
Content leader: I think if you talk to
any [Epsilon team member], they'll
say, "Oh yeah, we've got fantastic
team work," Well, every program's got
team work.
On this program, [the Program
Manager] provided a strong network for
team work. He allowed it to happen
easily. It's more than just
collocation or expertise.
For instance, take the EP
prototype build; chassis engineering
was given credit for having 100% of
their parts there, and that was the
first time something like that has
been accomplished. And that says a lot
about the strength of the engineering
community as well as others who helped
with that endeavor. It's like every
day you're putting on your Epsilon
suit and you're going in there and
you're going to make a difference.
[The Program Manager] made the
program very, very inclusive. He was
adamant about having suppliers in
there for [internal prototype
meetings]. The meetings up front were
pretty boring but Epsilon seemed to
achieve their success because of the
meetings.
· Deliberate encouragement of informality and friendship
Some attributed the quality of the Epsilon team process (at least through first
production prototype [lPP]) to collocation. Some attributed it to the people who
had been chosen for the team, and the quality of the engineers. Others argued that
the team appointment process was random; indeed, Epsilon probably didn't get the
"best" engineers, who would have gone to a higher-visibility product like Theta2 or
2 "Theta" is a code name for a highly successful and best-selling vehicle which AutoCo produced in
the mid 1980's. The success of Theta is credited with putting AutoCo in a financially solvent position
and allowed investment in other vehicle development programs. In order to achieve its success, the
Theta program "broke" a number of product development rules. Although not always judged as
successful in its product development efforts (milestones, timing, quailty, warranty and so forth),
Theta was highly successful in the marketplace. The team that "went all out" to get Theta to market
was not highly acknowledged within AutoCo for what was widely thought to be a heroic effort. A
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Sigma. No matter the cause, there was an atmosphere of informality and
friendliness which promoted good working relationships among team members.
Managers invested in and sought to actively encourage the development of a climate
which allowed people to work more informally with one another.
Off site meetings where people were in
residence were typically frowned upon at
AutoCo because of cost implications.
The time and effort the core team put
into developing relationship and open
communication was not valued by all
team members.
How important is it to develop a focus
on the personal as well as the
professional relationship?
Was knowing people beyond their role
something that would help team
members through more challenging and
ambiguous situations?
Engineer: There was a three-day off-
site [Oct. 1991], where you basically
had to walk away from your desk,
designs and drawings. A lot of the
team thought it was a waste of time; I
think a lot of people walked away
still not exactly sure what [the
Launch Manager] and [the Program
Manager] were trying to do. To me, the
most critical thing that happened
there was it really glued the team
together. It was the first time
everybody looked around and really
realized they were all in this boat
together, and it was powerful.
Some of the dynamics and
camaraderie and friendship came from
living together at the hotel for three
days, eating together, working
together, and going and having a beer
together. There's something about
friendship outside of the work place
that I think really helps build trust.
If you met new people and had a beer
with them or whatever, then two months
later if you had a problem with an
issue on the job you felt a little bit
more comfortable approaching them. And
I think it's human nature that if you
get an opportunity to know a little
bit more about a person's family and
their interests outside of work, you
trust them more than a total stranger.
At the off-site we started talking
about visions, and what the car was
going to be, and everybody's roles and
I think it created the bond. It was a
reality check: This group of people
was going to build this car and either
make it a success or not.
A mindset that "no one has all the answers"
The managers told people that they didn't know. They needed to learn too, and
they needed to create the conditions where their teams could learn. This statement
supporting "not knowing," ran counter to the expectations most managers and
engineers held - of one another, their system, and themselves.
number of the managers on the Epsilon program, including the Program Manager, had previously
worked on the Theta program.
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How can business culture learn to
acknowledge and accept mistakes in a
constructive way?
Vehicle development team leader: This
was foreign to a certain degree; it
was uncomfortable that the boss was
learning with us. He didn't have the
answers. We were going to do this
together. As uncomfortable as it was
on one hand, it was exciting on the
other, because all of a sudden we felt
like we were paving new ground. We
weren't just being fed "the right
thing to do in a corporate environment
today."
Some of the appeal may have to do
with the word "failure." If you
stumbled, it wasn't perceived by [the
Program Manager] as a failure.
Instead, the reaction was: "It was a
good honest effort, I appreciate your
energies, and what have we learned
from this?"
Behavioral versus technical: a zero-sum game?
As the Epsilon program developed, the core team placed strong emphasis on what
they called "process" issues --explicitly learning how to improve human
communication skills, decision making methods, and understanding of each
others' points of view. This emphasis on behavioral considerations-people and
process-was neither familiar nor well understood in AutoCo, which has a heritage
of strong technical and engineering achievement. In the larger company culture,
most people felt that time was scarce and thus needed to be invested, as much as
possible, in technology and engineering.
These thoughts about time were based on an implicit assumption that behavioral and
technical skills were caught in a zero-sum game; one could only be improved at the
expense of the other. In contrast, the Epsilon team leaders believed that a well-
designed learning process would result in engineering and people skills reinforcing
each other. Technological capabilities could be more easily applied, and have
greater impact, as engineers' people skills improved and they developed the
capacity to handle systemic and interrelated issues.
Does the AutoCo culture hold an
assumption that developing process
knowledge and understanding among
people detracts from engineering
knowledge and technical achievement?
Vice President: The first thing we have
to do is make sure that people really
understand the engineering processes -
DVP&R, QOS, prototype process, change
control, the timing discipline, and so
forth. If you asked me, "Do I do that
before I do any teamwork and team
building?" - the answer would be an
unequivocal yes. I think if you don't
have a fundamentally strong engineering
framework, then no amount of team
building or team process will ever
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The comments here were echoed by
many people at AutoCo: "First handle
the technical and then, if you have time
left, you can work on the behavioral. "
Do "process people" sometimes assume
that their work is denigrated by the
larger culture, when in fact it is not?
Process skills are difficult to measure,
and their impacts are not easily assessed
from the outside. How, then, can
process work be evaluated? An implicit
assumption, which came out clearly in
other interviews, was that if you can't
measure it, you can't manage it.
Do efforts in behavioral skills detract
from "getting this car program
implemented?"
Is there an assumption that resolving the
tradeoff between technical and behavioral
needs would extend a manager's work
beyond the hours available in a day?
overcome that weak system. You'll fail.
The team will thrash about with all
kinds of good intentions.
Now, the converse, I guess, is -
assuming you have a fundamentally solid
engineering process - that as you
encounter difficulties or fall behind
in one area, team building and the
human side of teamwork come into play.
A team can rally, help each other
overcome difficulties and move on.
As I understand organizational
learning, it preaches an appreciation
for the other person's point of view.
If you, as a team person, understand
that your action or non-action causes
another person a problem, then you will
try hard to make that not happen. That
understanding comes from team building
experiences. The team is a very large
family that's working together. How you
measure that understanding, I don't
know.
Program Manager's Boss: I could tell
that the Vice President was really
interested in getting this car program
implemented. I think there were times
when he was concerned that the team was
spending too much time on the soft
stuff and that could get in the way of
hard results.
I have been very supportive of this
work, but at the same time continued to
stress to [the Program Manager] that he
had to get results.
The dilemma of integrating process and engineering
knowledge
Despite the team leaders' intentions to have process knowledge and engineering
knowledge reinforce each other, the synthesis was imperfect in practice. In at least
one case, there were complaints that the engineering knowledge was short-changed.
This had to do with the team's change of structure - bringing engineering and
process authority together, assigned to one group of people - without looking
closely at the assumptions that these people would hold about one another.
Content leader: But when it came to
dealing with some of the particularly
difficult engineering issues, we were
left out in left field, and we had no
one to go to. I don't think it was
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Not all engineers felt included. The fact
that Launch and Program Managers were
not engineers meant that they didn't
jump into difficult engineering problems
and participate in resolving them.
Instead, they put them back on the team.
As the comment shows, some engineers
did notfeelfree to raise this problem.
[the Program Manager's] problem to get
involved with these issues, because he
doesn't know about engineering. But we
should have been able to discuss the
problem [that engineers felt
unsupported.] I think after a while we
recognized it and we avoided
[discussing it].
Bringing the process leaders and the content leaders together on a team, it was
thought, would allow them to recognize one another's blind spots and develop an
appreciation for how the other side saw things. This, however, did not always
happen.
The contrast between process knowledge
and engineering knowledge was
prominent within the Epsilon team as
well as in the larger organization.
People seemed to be experts at one or
the other, but not both. Communication
was not strong between the two groups
of experts and some issues may have
been overlooked.
How can we design learning so that
technical and process knowledge
reinforce each other?
Could members of both groups be
empowered simultaneously?
Content leader: There were some rough
roads on this program. There used to be
a conventional breakdown of car program
management. You'd have separate
managers for business planning, vehicle
engineering, launch, and vehicle
development.
On Epsilon, they tried to combine
all those skills into one person. This
was the first time they tried that
management system and the way they
implemented it didn't work very well.
It worked in fits and starts.
The real engineers all ended up
reporting to the Chief Engineer, and
the planning types ended up reporting
to [the Launch Manager]. [The Launch
Manager] is not an engineer by
background. The planning people worked
with the Design Center effectively, and
knew how to talk about the features of
the car, but they didn't have the
background to say, "OK, now we need A
and B completed by this time and we
always have problems with B, so let's
concentrate our efforts there."
We found out after a three-month
delay, for example, that some
engineering issues affecting the audio
system were not being elevated to the
Chief Engineer's level of discussion.
Some of the vehicle leaders didn't seem
to know enough to bring up the right
questions. They should have had much
more deliberate communication between
the groups from the beginning.
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Theme 2: Setting an example of non-authoritarian
leadership
The majority of Epsilon team members commented that the Launch Manager and the
Program Manager not only said they believed in openness and honesty, but acted in
ways that showed they believed in its value. Their behaviors were striking because
they contrasted with the way "typical" program managers behaved, and the ways
these managers themselves had behaved in the past.
Leadership roles: modeling new behavior
People throughout the Epsilon team, when asked what factors provided them with
the greatest opportunity to learn and change, singled out the examples set by the
Program Managers' "walking their talk."
Content leader: I've known [the
Program Manager] for 25 years. He was
a typical senior program director when
he came aboard - very autocratic and
power-based, and always had been. But
I've seen [the Program Manager] do a
180-degree turn in the last two years.
It wasn't sudden; there were a lot of
very subtle bends in the road over
time. But he has gone through a
complete change in management style.
[The Launch Manager] deserves a lot of
the credit for turning [the Program
Manager] around, but as [the Program
Manager] began to see the value in the
learning labs, he became more
supportive and he initiated a lot of
the new approach.
Many people commented on the changes
the Program Manager had undergone.
Those who had known him for years, or
even decades, often made remarks about
his changed behavior. He had changed
from having a punishing, frustrated,
angry style to being relaxed,
approachable, and willing to ask
questions, listen, and learn. This made
everyone more willing to raise questions
and problems - not just directly with
the Program Manager, but with the entire
team
I enjoyed it because it was the
first time in 30 years at AutoCo that
I, as an individual, felt valued by
management. I felt that they had an
absolute trust in me and in the team -
not initially, not midway through the
program, but by the end of the
program. They provided the vision and
they gave us the guidance from a total
car point of view, but they put
absolute trust in us. They would ask,
"What do you guys think is the best
for the car? Here is your objective.
How do you think you'll do it? Tell
me. 
I think we responded very
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The managers created an atmosphere
which helped people feel safe and valued.
They worried, however, if that style was
viable in the larger organization.
positively. Because I had trust from
them, I put a lot of trust in my team.
On other programs, I was constantly
double-checking and telling people
what to do - not asking them, "What do
you think we should do?" I think we
felt the weight of the responsibility
we were given, and we tried to do a
much better job because of that. I
think we succeeded. It's enthused a
lot of people who had not been
enthused at AutoCo for 20 years. And
it depended on the program leader's
managing style.
To be honest with you, I'm spoiled.
I'm worried. Who am I going to work
for next, and can I adapt to that old
AutoCo style again?
Comments by senior managers become part of a team's collective "mythology."
Three people, for example, mentioned a meeting over a microphone package, in
which the Launch Manager confronted an engineer in a way that people weren't
used to, especially in front of other AutoCo managers. After a pause, the Launch
Manager explained the reasoning behind his disappointment and inquired into the
engineer's circumstances.
The Launch manager was honest and
direct.
Launch Manager (at the microphone
package meeting): You know, I am very
disappointed with what you've done. I
just want you to know that. I don't
understand why you did it. I need you
to help me understand and I think we
all need to understand what our roles
are here.
Engineer, an attendee at the meeting:
I had never seen that honesty and
openness from a man at his level
before.
Engineers knew they were trusted because
they were not required to complete the
paper trail that documented who did what
and when. This approach saved time and
freed people to concentrate on the tasks at
hand
Another Engineer: There's so little
paper work on this team compared to
other teams. We didn't have to prove
everything to the last detail to [the
Program Manager]. Other program
managers spend so much time on
studies.
Say, for example, that a program
manager wanted you to put the
speedometer in the A pillar. An
engineer would say, "I don't know how
to tell you, but you can't do it."
EPSILON Learning History * Theme 2: Non-authoritarian Leadership 
* Page 26
I  earning History Theme 2: Non-authoritarian Leadership Page 26
"I don't care," the manager would
say. I want you to come back and tell
me why." So you go out and do all
these wiring studies. You pull a
designer in to get the drawings done.
You talk to your division manager. You
get a nice document pulled together,
showing every tic mark why you can't
do this, and you call everyone
together into his office and run
through all the points. And he would
say, "OK," as you've known all along
he would, because the answer is
implicit. But [the Program Manager]
didn't have to do that.
We didn't make blind
recommendations. The team did their
homework every time. But we did not
have to spend hours at the computer
getting our reports to look just
perfect.
The behaviors of program managers
extended to people outside AutoCo.
Suppliers, vital producers of the parts
that make up the new cars, also
commented on the treatment they noticed
from Epsilon program managers.
Epsilon product manager at a key
supplier: Here's the famous quote from
[the Program Manager]. We were sitting
in a meeting one time looking at this
floor console and he was playing with
some of the features on it. He looked
at us and said: "You guys really do
good work." Then he played with the
floor console some more and said, "You
guys are really expensive."
He didn't yell at the cost. He made
a statement about value versus cost.
He liked the floor console, but he
thought it cost a lot. Certainly, cost
is important; but others at AutoCo
would have said, "You've got to cut
the price," without regard to the
value being delivered to the customer.
Even a small amount of positive
reinforcement seemed to carry a lot of
I was walking down the hall here
with a young engineer from [my
company], and [the Program Manager]
saw us and stopped to chat. "You
know," he said, "I really like it when
I see you guys walking through here
like this. It lets me know that you
think this program is important to
you." He didn't have to say that.
Tactically, I don't know the degree to
which he meant it. But it had a
positive effect. The young engineer
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weight with suppliers. Those interviewed
for this learning history sometimes
commented that they were "used to being
beat up" elsewhere in the auto industry,
and thus appreciated their treatment here.
went back to our supply company office
and said, "You ought to hear [the
Program Manager]. He said he likes the
way we support the program." That got
translated into a whole host of things
that were all positive for our work on
the car. And that was just a side
comment going down the hall.
What made it possible for leaders to change their
behavior effectively?
We examined this question, directly and indirectly, in the interviews. The
responses clustered into several ways in which new behaviors were demonstrated.
The core team meetings.
These meetings, limited to the senior-most managers on the Epsilon team, became a
concerted effort to improve communication among the Epsilon senior leadership.
That improvement, in turn, trickled down in ways that were noticed by engineers
on the program.
Team leader: Some people are natural-
born team leaders. I don't think [the
Program Manager] was one, but I think
he has become a dynamic leader now. I
don't think he would have changed
without the core team learning effort.
How do people begin to unlearn
behaviors that have rewarded them up
until now?
Teachers struggle with getting students
to unlearn the old to teach them
something new. That is a struggle, even
in an explicit learning environment.
What is possible in a business setting?
Is the team environment a necessary
factor in changing individual behaviors?
Launch Manager: It took the bosses
literally eight months to learn how to
quit being bosses. When we started
Epsilon, we knew all the answers.
That's why we were bosses. At least
one of us always knew that our answer
to the problem was the right answer;
and boy did we defend our positions!
We had conflict, mistrust,
gamesmanship: all the dysfunctional
stuff you hear about.
But, as we began to use the tools,
and practice with them, [we started to
listen to the rest of the Epsilon team
members]. Can you imagine the bosses
listening? We quit telling them what
to do. We started to inquire. We
started to challenge their
perceptions.
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Program management demonstrated commitment by taking part in
every learning lab.
Managers did more than talk about their behaviors. They participated in learning
events, exhibiting their own learning process and support to the team members.
Launch Manager: My fundamental role
[in the learning lab] was not so much
to teach a new insight as it was to
participate with them in creating a
psychological safety net... [To show
them] I was willing to make mistakes
with them and share my own
frustrations, and that it was okay to
discuss these issues.
Partnership: Having the two leaders learning in tandem
provided a necessary support for one another.
Several people (including the Program Manager and Launch Manager) explicitly
pointed out how important the two men were to each others' success. They needed
each other for perspective as "mirrors" to each other. They also needed each other's
advice and encouragement.
Launch Manager: Without [the Program
Manager's] acceptance of the process
If there had only been one leader involved changes; without [the Program
in this learning effort, would the same Manager's] encouragement for us to
events have happened? learn; without [the Program Manager's]
coaching in the difficult situations,
this would not have been possible.
Purpose: the Program Manager and the Launch Manager never
came into the project saying, "We want to become better
people" for our own sake.
Throughout all the interviews, the Program Manager never said, "I set out to
change my personality - to become the kind of guy of whom people say, 'He really
listens."' He points out that his intent, from the beginning, was better
communication to help develop a common sense of purpose across functional
chimneys. In retrospect, modeling new behavior was a means to that end.
Epsilon leaders faced a dilemma when they tried to explain their success to other
AutoCo managers. On one hand, they were reluctant to emphasize their own
personal change because that carried an implicit message that, "you [other AutoCo
managers] must change your behavior as well." On the other hand, if they left out
their personal change, a key element was lost.
Reflection: The leaders continued to increase their own
capability to understand changes in themselves and others.
People noticed the efforts the managers were making to reflect on their behavior,
learn from their experiences, and improve their own managerial capabilities over
time.
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Researcher: I saw the changes in [the
Program Manager]. Earlier in the
program, I saw how intimidating he
could be, sitting in that chair and
grilling people. He could be very
accusing: "I will not accept that."
And I could see why he acted that way;
in the AutoCo culture that is the only
way to have credibility, to get heard,
and to get things done.
What kind of personal development is
necessary to come to the realization that
some behaviors practiced in business are
not compatible with what others might
call "basic human values?"
Can these kinds of changes be made
when thinking in terms of "what is cost
effective?"
Here is an example of the type of
conversation and reflection that resulted
from new behaviors.
Can this sort of conversation be a regular
hedge against the danger of jumping to
conclusions?
[The Program Manager] lamented that
he got screwed unless he acted
autocratically. We had one meeting
where he talked about a dilemma where
he was unsatisfied with one person's
priorities. He felt he had to go back
and make that person's life more
miserable than anybody else's. That
was his standing strategy up to that
point.
I asked [the Program Manager] if he
could share the dilemma with the
person involved. Perhaps he could say
something like, "Look, I'd rather not
make your life difficult, but I have
found that if I don't do this, I get
screwed. Can we work together
differently or is this the only option
that I have?"
He said that he hadn't thought
about doing that, and it couldn't
hurt, because he always had the other
option. I don't know if he ever did
that...
Program Manager: I was really upset
and I said, "We're going to miss this
[deadline]..." I really gave them a
hard time and they sat there and
listened.
Then one team leader looked at me
and said, "I can see why you would
feel that way from what you've heard.
Let me give you a different
perspective on what's going on." He
just stopped me cold and told me what
was happening from his perspective.
Then we talked about what we might do
differently.
When he left, I had an entirely
different feeling about what he had
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done, what he was trying to
accomplish, and how he was doing it.
He had a better understanding about
what I was after. I didn't do that. He
did that.
The changed behavior of the two top managers now began to filter down to
influence other key leaders on the Epsilon team. Sometimes, this was the result of
deliberate interventions by the top managers.
What conditions were created which
allowed the Launch Manager to act as a
coach to the engineer in this situation?
Launch Manager: I called in [a problem
supervisor] and said, "Let me tell you
what I'm hearing in the halls about
you. I don't know whether it's
true...." I repeated complaints I had
heard and he defended himself. I said,
"What do you think we should do about
it?"
He said he didn't know.
I suggested, "Why don't you go and
ask people what they think about you?
Why don't you do an interview about
yourself?"
What he heard wasn't pleasant.
He did that over the next two
months. Then he came back and said,
"My God, [Launch Manager], I couldn't
believe what they were telling me,
although I had to practically beat it
out of them. I've really been a
horrible person. I learned a lot about
myself and I don't like what I've
learned."
And I just left it alone. Four
years ago, I would have said, "You've
got to stop being a tyrant." I would
have told him to go to the Carnegie
School of Whatever-it-is. And he would
have just defended himself against my
criticism. But if he heard it from the
people that worked with him, he
couldn't ignore it. He has made a lot
of progress since then.
Modeling new behavior: "I don't trust you"
The learning lab created an opportunity for people on the Epsilon team to begin to
address deeper issues, with the team leaders involved.
Content leader X": Another content
leader ("Y") and I were down at the
learning lab and we were going through
EPSILON Learning History * Theme 2: Non-authoritarian Leadership 
Page 31
SI  Learning History Theme 2: Non-authoritarian Leadership Page 31
this struggle [with the Launch
Manager] about managing change
control. My biggest pet peeve is that
we were wasting our time in sometimes
four and five change control meetings
a week. This is not unique to Epsilon;
this was going on for years at AutoCo.
But [the Program Manager] and [the
Launch Manager] would go after the
little [change issues], rather than
letting us manage them ourselves.
And managers, having promoted a
climate of openness, heard directly about
the impact they had on engineers.
Which required them to answer
honestly...
Once this honest statement was made,
was there any course of action left but to
do something about it?
...and that, in turn, allowed people to
speak much more truthfully about
underlying issues.
How much self-esteem does it take, under
these circumstances, to keep from feeling
threatened or attacked?
Launch Manager: "Look [Launch
Manager]!" they finally said, "You're
making our lives miserable. You're
making our jobs difficult because
you're trying to control us. I can't
get anything approved without coming
to you and getting permission from you
to get it approved. Why do we need a
system that is so cumbersome?"
Lo and behold, I said: "Because I
don't trust you."
Internal consultant: When [the Launch
Manager] said that (and, actually, he
shouted it), there was an
uncomfortable silence in the room.
What went through our minds was: We
always suspected [the Launch Manager]
didn't trust us, and now he's telling
us as much. Then [the Launch Manager]
proceeded to say, "And let me tell you
why I don't trust you. If I did
nothing to pressure you, you wouldn't
meet your deadlines."
Launch Manager: I would have had a
difficult time saying that in the
past. It would have cut the cord of
communication and any hope for trust.
But what happened next was amazing.
I hadn't insulted them. They didn't
get mad at me. They simply accepted
that it was my position: I thought
they would disrupt the system. And I
accepted their position: that they
were upset with the way I was acting
with them. All of a sudden the truth
came out. We finally got down to the
nitty gritty - a meaningful discussion
about how to dispel the problem.
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But, what impacted the leaders didn't
always have the same impact on team
members.
But it did appear to have an effect in
another sense...
...which others noticed some time later.
Content leader "X": In that
discussion, [the Launch Manager] said
he would help us. He did write a nice
strong letter. As it turned out, our
solution didn't matter, because within
a week, it was all turned around. We
were forced to start daily "pink"
meetings [named for the color of
change request forms], and that was
it. So it didn't work.
Another content leader [interviewed
8/93]: I'm one of the people that "X"
and "Y" had fought with in the past.
I've noticed already that they handle
the issues differently than they did
six months ago. They try to listen.
They understand that it comes back
around to them in the end a lot of
times, because you can stonewall
something only for so long.
Recently X" made a change that I
was pretty upset about. I called him
up and said, "You SOB," and started
talking through with him the technical
effects of that change on my part of
the car.
And he actually apologized to me.
He said, "You know, I'm sorry. We
didn't know we were doing it to you."
I called Y" up not long ago and
said, "Your engineer rejected this
change, but we really need it." I
assumed that he was going to refuse to
help me, and I would have had to force
the issue with [the Program Manager].
Instead, he said, "We did that for
a good reason. Why don't you and I
meet and talk about it?"
We met and brainstormed together
yesterday morning, and came up with a
couple of ideas. That would have been
unheard of in the past; he would have
simply said, "I'm not helping you."
I realized that I've got to be
retrained too, because I still don't
trust them.
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Damage from backsliding
The Epsilon leaders occasionally "fell off the wagon" - they slipped back to the
authoritarian management style. Stories of lost temper, or accusations of "playing
favorites," seem to last for years, and some of those stories were told in our
interviews - particularly about the damage done when a leader did not rein in his
temper. This story is typical:
Do people expect more from managers
who espouse openness and cooperation?
Team leader: In January 1992 we were
having a lot of problems on our team.
At an off-site meeting, which was
supposed to be a group team-building
session, [the Program Manager] blew
up. He told us that everybody was
finding excuses for why our division
screwed up. That was the low point of
our morale as a team.
He apologized, but it happened
repeatedly. He would fixate on us as a
scapegoat, and a week later he'd
apologize one more time. After about
three times, I made a joke in front of
everybody. I said, "When am I going to
start believing you, [Program
Manager]?"
What shift in assumptions drive a leader
to move from a command-and-control
style to a more collaborative approach?
Was this approach really collaborative?
Changes were still required that reflected
the program manager's interests, but now
time was spent listening and considering.
But in the last year and a half,
after he started to espouse the
learning methods, he's changed quite a
bit. Now, when he asked for a last-
minute change that we would consider
an unfair request on his part - say, a
minor change in nomenclature which
nonetheless affects our software and
other technical considerations - he
called in the design supervisor and me
and personally explained why the name
change was so important to marketing
the vehicle. He took the time to
personally ask our support. That was a
big difference from the way he used to
dictate from above.
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Theme 3: Learning labs: Teaching techniques for
thinking differently
What exactly did people feel they experienced in the learning labs conducted by
MIT? How much did the labs improve their capabilities, and how much did those
improvements affect their work on the car? Finally, how much did they feel the
learning lab techniques affected their attitudes about learning?
From our interviews, we tried to find answers to these questions. Some participants
were indifferent to the labs, others found them surprisingly relevant.
Program Manager: The MIT stuff is not
new. I don't think there's a single
technique that hasn't been talked
about for 20 or 30 years. But they
have put it together in a powerful way
that lets people understand it
quickly, implement it and really do
something with it.
Although the learning techniques and tools were not new individually (many simply
represented common sense), their integration and use in a seminar seemed
powerful.
Designing the learning
Research conducted on these computer
simulations at MIT has shown the
difficulty in transferring learning from
one simulator to other real world
environments.3
Would the group-based nature of learning
lab instruction, along with teaching
techniques for communication and
inquiring into mental models, provide an
effective bridge for transferring learning
lab insights? What was the impact of
how these techniques were taught, with
managers teaching their subordinates?
labs: from the beginning
Researcher: A group of us at MIT had
created a learning laboratory at
Hanover Insurance, using a computer-
based management simulator. There, we
had learned how effective it was to
tell people about mental models and
surfacing assumptions. I had that
framework and flow in mind when we
began to set up the learning labs at
Epsilon.
The core team thought that our work
with them, including the system
dynamics and mental models tools, was
valuable. They wanted to include more
people in the conversation. We decided
to develop the lab as a "practice
field" - a safe place to talk about
and work with the issues that
participants would be wrestling with.
3 The dissertation research of Bent Bakken (Learning and Transfer of Understanding in Dynamic
Decision Environments, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Sloan School of Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993) reports the difficulty of subjects transferring their
learning from one simulation environment to another, similar, simulation environment.
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Sidebar: Agenda for a learning lab
The Epsilon learning labs were two day sessions where participants were away from their work as they learned
new tools and used them to reflect on their own issues. A typical learning lab had the following flow and
content:
Day 1 Systems Perspective
Introductions and Objectives
* teach techniques for
thinking & learning
* reinforce learning as a part
of work
* achieve commitment to use
new tools in work
Center for Organizational
Learning and its Work
Overview of Learning Lab
* distribute learning journals
What is Learning?
* exercise in personal
learning
* overview of five learning
disciplines
* problem solving vs.
problem articulation
Mental Models
* how we perceive reality
* as barrier to team learning
· writing a left hand column
case exercise
* ladder of inference
* balancing inquiry and
advocacy
Practice versus Performance
Environments
Day 2
Creative Orientation
* creating shared visions
* stories of successful team
experiences
* creative tension structure
* personal visions exercise
* barriers and enablers to car
vision exercise
* levels of explanation
* new ways of thinking and
perceiving
* changing ourselves versus
changing "them"
* systems archetypes
* causal loop diagrams
* systems archetype exercises
Management Flight Simulator
Session
* overview of product
development MicroWorld
* how to use computer
interface (simulator
controls)
* strategy sheets
* simulation runs
* debriefing
Learning Lab Debriefing
* discussion groups and
reporting out, or
group dialogue
Practice fields are meant to take people away from everyday performance pressures,
and allow them to develop some new attitudes and approaches in a simulated
environment. Just as a flight simulator prepares airline pilots for emergencies and
pressures that would be shocking in real life, a practice field helps people learn to
cope with emergencies and management pressures before they occur.
Launch Manager: In his speeches, Peter
Senge asks: "How do great teams become
great teams?" Well, they practice.
Orchestras practice; baseball teams
practice. Great teams tend to
practice. But we don't have that
capability in the business
organization. So how do we become
great teams? Well, we just kind of
luck into it.
We wondered: "Is there a
possibility for us to create an
environment where we can create that
kind of practice?" The way to do it is
to start with learning labs: small
groups in which we can begin to
transform the way people think, behave
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and communicate in teams, and then
create models that they can use to
practice the behavior in reality.
Can AutoCo managers incorporate some
of these strategies into current meetings?
And practice in that way? Or must it be
done through formal learning labs?
The participation of management at
AutoCo in these sessions, even as
speakers for the dinners, was repeatedly
mentioned by participants as one of the
most important things they remembered
about the sessions.
Launch Manager: [The Program Manager]
did not directly participate in the
learning labs. We were afraid his
presence would inhibit the free flow
of information and discussion in the
group. Whereas apparently I was in a
position where I would not have that
effect. We were going to test this by
bringing [the Program Manager] into a
learning lab, but we didn't have the
opportunity.
Nonetheless, [the Program
Manager's] involvement was critical.
He would always show up on the
Thursday evening dinner. And we would
have a guest speaker come in,
generally from inside AutoCo: The
Program Manager's boss, the segment
director, or an operations person who
has been a champion of this approach.
Choosing learning lab participants
The original strategy was to include everyone on the Epsilon team in the learning
labs. Later, the team realized that a critical mass of practitioners could influence the
whole team, without having to put the whole team through the labs.
Would this strategy work for other
organizations?
Participants in the labs were selected,
rather than invited to volunteer.
Launch Manager: We had four Learning
Labs for about 100 people in total.
The first was in the Fall of 1992. We
picked an interior team and an
electrical team, deliberately choosing
younger engineers whom we thought
would be "early adopters": more open
and receptive to new ideas. We
conducted a two-day session. It had
taken us, the Core Team, eight months
to learn to "stop being bosses": to
begin trusting and communicating with
each other. Now, how could we
accomplish the same result with a
group of 20 people in two days?
Well, to my surprise, the Learning
Lab went extremely well. I was elated
at how quickly they grasped the
learning tools and began to use them -
first, right in the Learning Lab, and
then elsewhere on the team.
We went on to another learning lab
with some very tough people: engineers
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who had been at AutoCo for many years,
whom we didn't think would ever open
their minds up to new learning. These
were crusty people, who were sitting
there wondering what the matter was
with us.
We discovered that in only two days
these engineers were very quick to
adopt these new tools. One of my
roughest and meanest team leaders had
been there 35 years; we had to
practically drag him into the learning
lab by force. Afterwards, he walked up
to me and volunteered, "Gee, [the
Launch Manager]. If I knew how good
this was, I would have brought
everybody that works for me."
The systems archetypes and "systems thinking" skills
At first glance, work on systems thinking is akin to "process mapping" and other
quality movement methods. Participants uncover the hidden interrelationships that
govern their own work. However, the mapping techniques are based on system
dynamics theory (which is, in turn, based on servomechanism theory). This shows
how situations evolve over time: how a "fix" may ultimately backfire, or how
pressures may grow or diminish. As one internal consultant put it: "The systems
thinking work shows how you can't just throw people and money at problems."
For more on archetypes, see Sidebar: What are systems archetypes?, page 7.
The tragedy of the power supply
One of the first understandings to emerge from the Epsilon systems work was the
"tragedy of the power supply," a case in which two functional groups on the
Epsilon Team were involved:
The multiple teams who were involved
could see only the importance of their
part of the power supply, and could not
reach an agreement that accommodated
everyone.
Launch Manager: The team spent five
months trying to resolve an electrical
issue which they couldn't resolve at
their own levels. Each engineer had a
component they wanted to maximize.
Each engineer's organization said to
them, "Don't give in." So whenever
they came to meetings, they argued the
same issues: "No, I can't give up the
air conditioning unit design. We need
it to be the best in the world." Or,
"I'm not going to change the headlight
designs because they have to be the
best in the world."
But we had a battery system which
couldn't accommodate all these best-
in-the-world components. Usage was
twelve amps above capacity. If we had
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Doesn't an engineer, or team of
engineers, who couldn't resolve a
problem consider himself, or themselves,
as having failed?
What if the problem that they sought to
solve fell outside of their domain of
technical and strategic decisions?
An insight into the structure of the
problem helped the team seek the outside
help that it needed.
identified this earlier, we might have
been able to put in a second battery,
or a higher-capacity battery. But by
then, the area available in the car
couldn't be made any bigger. So they
were trapped; they had to start
compromising. And they couldn't
resolve the disagreement, despite all
their intentions.
Content leader: Embroiled in these
arguments at a Battery Charging Team
meeting, I suddenly thought back to
the systems work from the first
Learning Lab. "Do you think this
sounds like a tragedy of the commons?"
I asked. I talked about the Tragedy of
the Commons systems archetype: The
more a common resource is depleted,
the more individual actors fight for a
bigger share.
One of the process consultants, who
knew the work, reminded us that it's
very difficult to resolve a tragedy of
the commons issue at the individual
level. "How would you feel," he asked,
"if we went to the Program Manager and
the Launch Manager with this?"
"I'd feel really bad," I said. "I'd
feel like I failed." But we realized
how the system had created a no-win"
situation, and there was no shame in
going to the Launch Manager and the
Program Manager with this systems
issue.
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Participants agree that the value of this
systems story, and others that surfaced in
the learning labs, comes from their real-
world relevance.
Program Manager: Finally, they mapped
the story for themselves. They laid
out all their individual problems and
their incentives: Their organization's
goals, how the results would be
measured, and what the effects of a
solution would be on that chimney and
its performance measures. It was clear
that they would all be individually
right, but the car would fail. No one
wanted to be criticized by his
management for doing something foolish
with his component to make somebody
else successful. But they could all
accept what they would have to do to
make the car work - if the Program
Manager told them to do it. They
accepted my orders, even though the
orders went against their chimney's
objective, because they knew that's
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In the two reinforcing loops (shown with snowballs) at left, each components group pursues actions which
are individually beneficial - building electrical components with high functionality, which leads to high
electrical requirements. In combination with the other components, this raises the total electrical load
requirement to a point where the battery power available per component runs up against the limit of total
battery capacity. Facing these limits, each design team, within its own group, adds even more functionality,
as justification for being allotted as much battery power as possible from the common pool. The result is
individual gain, but collective pain.
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what it would take to solve the
tragedy of the commons.
Once they were worked out, there was a tendency to package the systems stories
for wider distribution. Unfortunately, this gave the impression that the stories had
primary value as prepackaged lessons, rather than as learning experiences.
"I'm still hearing the same stories about 'the tragedy of the power supply,"' said an
internal consultant. 'It's almost become a joke with some of those folks: 'Why
don't you whip out the old 'tragedy' chart?' So now, people tend to think that
everything is a 'tragedy of the commons,' when they should be investigating their
own situations." Does this type of pre-packaged learning needed to be guarded
against, as it appears to drive out experiential learning?
Did people use systems maps as a way to
present problems to the Program
Manager because they thought he would
be better able to hear them?
Program Manager: I had heard of a few
examples of system mapping. About most
of them I said to myself, "That's
rubbish. They would have come to that
conclusion anyway." But in this case,
if they hadn't mapped the problem,
they would have fooled around for
another couple of months, and it would
have been too late. At the time of the
EP prototype we would have discovered
that the batteries went dead, and we
would have had to do something
drastic.
Another case was the battle between
the chassis team and a development
team that was struggling with noise,
vibration, and harshness. Each side
had a problem, and every time one side
fixed it, it made the other side's
problem worse. Both sides knew that if
they had talked to each other earlier,
they could have come up with a
collaborative solution. But they
hadn't. So both sides attributed
motives to each other: "These guys are
not willing to communicate. They don't
care about us or our problems. So
screw them." They stopped talking to
each other.
Then we decided to map the problem
together. It changed the way the two
groups did business with each other.
In fact, the chassis guys became very
active with the development guys in
design up front, instead of waiting
back home for a transmittal from the
development guys telling them what
they had to do to fix the car.
There was nothing novel in the system
diagram. Any of them could have
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thought of it by himself. But because
they did it together, and because they
could draw something they all could
see, they changed the way they worked
together.
The ladder of inference and "mental models" skills
Outsiders find it difficult to grasp why these mental models skills seem so important
to participants. One reason is that they offer a tangible, accessible way to quickly
change non-productive conversations, and to build the ability in oneself to ask
effective questions.
See Sidebar: What are the "ladder of inference" and "left-hand column"?, page 8.
Many of the simplest, almost common
sense, techniques were what people
remembered and continued using outside
the learning lab environment.
Was some of the influence that the
learning labs achieved related to the fact
that engineers were open to learning
management, behavioral and
communication skills when they came
from a respected technical university?
What does this influence say about the
"mental models" of engineers?
Many people commented on the
usefulness of the ladder of inference (also
often called the ladder of abstraction).
Team leader: When you have the time to
practice the "mental models" skills,
they're not needed. But when you get
into a crisis mode, everybody starts
scrambling and worrying about their
own thing; the communications fall
off. You're facing off against body
engineers not wanting to make a
change, or another division, and
people don't want to work together.
That's where if you can retain a
little bit of the skills, it helps you
through a little bit.
One tool from MIT that I think has
helped quite a bit is the phrase: "Let
me repeat what I think I hear you
saying. Is that right?" We use that in
meetings, and it helps in
communication quite a bit.
Team leader: For an engineer, the
material was very hard to grasp; it
was so intangible. But the presence of
MIT, as a respected university, gave
it a little bit more credibility. The
learning lab project wasn't just [the
Program Manager] and [the Launch
Manager]; it wasn't just an internal,
whimsical, fly-by-night plan.
Content leader: The ladder of
inference was worth its weight in gold
for me. If you wanted to make sure
that the other person wasn't just
saying a conjecture or assumption, you
could ask him to go down the ladder so
the conversation got back "down" [to
data]. All of a sudden, things would
clear up.
Engineer: One of my suppliers - an
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excellent supplier, by the way -
mentioned under his breath at the end
of a meeting that a part would be two
weeks late. He didn't want anyone but
me to hear him. I gathered my wits for
a minute, because it was really a
shock. We hadn't had any problems with
that part. I asked why it would be
late, and he said, "I'm not sure."
The ladder of inference concept created a
possibility in the minds of engineers that
the ways they "saw" things might be
different than how others saw them.
This led them to inquire before they
jumped into action.
The ladder of inference was a conceptual
tool which engineers, as this example
illustrates, used to create different
possibilities for how they communicated
with suppliers and other engineering
teams.
And by asking questions, instead of
demanding action, the engineer in this
example found out that there were
problems in the way AutoCo had handled
the supplier's paperwork.
The example illustrates how a
hierarchical culture plays itself out. The
engineers are given commands by their
bosses to get parts out, and they in turn
deal with suppliers in a command
orientedfashion. There was no latitude
to respond in any way except doing what
you were told.
I could see everyone's eyes in the
meeting hitting the roof. They were
saying to themselves: "God, Bob is an
idiot. What's wrong with him? We
thought he was a good guy."
At that point I could see we needed
to bring things down on the ladder.
Bob was not going to tell us any more.
Why would he? He had already risked
enough, and made himself look foolish.
So I consciously brought things down
to observable data.
"Look, Bob," I said, "If you don't
tell us where the problem is, we'll
never get to the root of this issue."
After a lot of prodding and pleading,
it came out that he thought it was a
problem with paperwork that we [at
AutoCo] had lost, and he didn't want
to be the one to tell us.
So I went back and checked.
AutoCo's system had misplaced not only
his paperwork, but a lot of paperwork.
It was causing parts to come in a
little later than anticipated, just
enough to mess up the build. Bob's
honesty allowed us to make sure
everything coordinated on time.
Traditionally I would have thought,
"I don't want to hear about Bob's
problems. He is an idiot." I wouldn't
have checked the reasoning which led
me to that assumption. I would have
said to him, "Just make sure the
part's on time." There would be
nothing he could do about it.
It's very difficult to use the new
approach when you're the only person
in the room who knows what it is. For
instance, someone will make a
statement like, Oh, Bob's seat belt's
going to be late." Everyone in the
meeting says, "Bob's an idiot." You've
EPSILON Learning History * Theme 3: Techniques for thinking differently Page 43
Moving conversations among groups of
people from beliefs and assumptions to
"observable data" was particularly helpful
in an engineering world where people
design and produce tangible, technical,
automobile parts that need to work
together.
Terms like "jumping up the rungs" or
"where are you on the ladder?" were used
to ask people to tell one another about
the data they had to support their
assertions.
jumped right up those rungs. No one
even says, "Why are we saying this?"
When I'm by myself, I'm more hesitant
to step out of my comfort zone and ask
that question in the group.
But if you have at least one other
person who has been through the
learning lab, you can bounce comments
off each other without people in the
meeting knowing what you're doing. It
builds and builds and you see it
taking effect. I'll be in a meeting
with "X" [an engineer I work closely
with], and he'll call someone else a
moron. I might say, "X, you're at the
top of your ladder." No one else knows
what that means. But he'll think about
it and say, "You know, you're right."
Then we discuss why the "morons" might
have done what they did, before we
carelessly jump all over them.
Content leader: When the learning lab
ended, I said, "Well, that was neat.
Let's get back to work." Very little
of it seemed to stick with me.
But after a couple of days, I
started thinking about it. We gave it
a try in our meetings. "Come on guys,"
I would say. "Let's start talking
about observable data here instead of
our opinions or our belief systems."
Because you don't make any progress at
all by shoving your opinion at the
other guy. By now, we recognize right
away now when that's happening. We
used to sit in meetings for hours, and
everyone walked out pissed off.
The ladder of inference was a technique which was taught in learning labs, and
provided a foundation for other activities, experiences and conversations that took
place in those "labs."
The "management flight simulators"
Some of the work of the learning lab centered around "simulation" exercises,
programmed onto computers by a core team of Epsilon and MIT people, in which
different strategies and approaches could be tested.
In general, the computer models weren't
considered as crucial as the systems and
mental model conversations.
Content leader: I thought one
beneficial thing was the computer game
we played at the end, where we could
see the consequences of our decisions.
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Sidebar: What is a "Management Flight Simulator"?
A management flight simulator
(MFS) is an interactive
decision-making computer
simulation. The Epsilon
learning labs used a
management flight simulator
based on the product
development process in the
automobile industry.
Underlying the computerized
"cockpit" (the simulator
controls) is a system dynamics
model, in which mathematical
formulas represent the links
between different variables in
the system. These interactions
have been tested and calibrated
through extensive field work in
a variety of organizations.
Nonetheless, like those of any
model, they represent a
simplification of the reality that
the model is intended to
describe.
A crucial feature of the
management flight simulator is
the environment in which
"play" is conducted. Instead of
simply "testing new strategies,"
as if they were playing a
computer game, participants
articulate their strategies ahead
of time, and the reasons why
they have chosen their course.
Then, the model helps them see
their own tacit, deeply held
theories about their business
environment and organization,
theories which guide many of
their decisions in real life.
Discussions with other team
members help everyone see how
those tacit theories affect the
entire operation.
This illustration shows the
"cockpit" (the on-screen
command center) of the Product
Development management flight
simulator. The left-hand part of
the screen shows indicators of
activity in the project (for
example, the percentage done).
The right-hand part allows the
participant to enter decisions (for
example, about the number of
process engineers to hire) and
select reports or graphs for
viewing. These reports and
graphs show, in detail, current
status and historical data.
Menu Bar. Click and hold mouse button on the menu choice and drag
the mouse to the desired command. Start a new game by selecting the
restart option under the explore menu.
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Many people said to me that they
The computer models were effective for
engagin sa , think that the thing that changed
engaging some AutoCo team members, their outlook on things the most was
but they ended up being seen as too time-
the computer game. They had thought
consuming (and perhaps a distraction).
they had all the answers, but they
plugged them into the computer and all
The models were abandoned after the of a sudden the red flag came up. We
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second leaning laboratory because other
exercises seemed more effective.
The comment here reflects one of the few
remarks singling out the computer
models as an important factor.
Perhaps different learning styles need to
be taken into account in the laboratory
designs?
It is interesting to ask the question
whether, for some people, the data they
get from a computer model has more
impact on them than what people tell
them?
didn't do as well as we thought we
would.
It was comparable to the "beer
game" that MIT uses in its courses. 4 I
had a fellow in powertrain sitting
three chairs away from me in the "beer
game." He was absolutely unmanageable,
positive he was doing everything
right. He made decisions and, in the
end, he messed up pretty bad. And
after that he was a totally different
person. He wasn't so adamant about
things.
Reinforcement: A learning room
To provide opportunities to continue and support the learning process, AutoCo
program managers created a "learning room" where they held weekly breakfast
meetings. This "learning room" was a conference room without a table, with flip
charts from learning labs on the walls, and chairs set in a circle to create and
encourage an atmosphere of peer-to-peer conversations. The breakfast meetings
entailed managers buying doughnuts and inviting engineers to "drop in" to ask
questions and for unstructured conversations.
How can reinforcement be designed in the
AutoCo environment, so people don't
lose the chance to practice learning skills
as part of everyday work?
Researcher [in mid-1994]: We're trying
to put support mechanisms in place:
conversations to continue and
reinforce the understandings which
people gained in the original labs.
Launch Manager: Once a week, Wednesday
morning, we asked members of the team
to come to the learning room. There
they could discuss anything they
wanted, but they had to leave the
baggage of the conventional way of
operating behind. "Bring your problems
and use the tools. Practice them."
You know what they say: "What
makes great teams? Practice." But how
many business teams practice? Well,
we're learning how to do that.
Reactions to the learning labs
General reactions to the learning labs were mixed. Some people we interviewed
weren't even sure they had been to one. Most remember being skeptical, yet being
impressed that the boss was in front of the room talking about mistakes and
learning from them.
4 For an explanation of playing "the beer distribution game" see Chapter 3, "Prisoners of the system,
or prisoners of our own thinking?"' in Senge, 1990, The Fifth Discipline, Doubleday/Currency, pgs.
27-54.
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Even when people found they learned in
the learning labs, it was seen with great
skepticism by their peers in other
groups. Was learning something that
engineers could talk openly about in a
culture that valued hard, scientific and
technical types of conversations and data?
As managers and engineers, AutoCo
people didn't know why it was effective.
Some only professed that it was
effective, which was their justification
for continuing and promoting the work
with MIT.
If people do not feel confident or capable
of applying the tools, is that cause for
concern? If it is causefor concern, does it
suggest that changes should be made in
a) the design of the AutoCo learning
effort and learning labs? b) the MIT
implementation of these tools? c) the
Assembly launch leader: When I learned
about these "dog and pony shows," I
thought, "Oh, they're flag waving." I
laughed at it. My God, what a waste
of time and money."
But I saw it work. The labs got
people talking to each other early on,
picking each others' brains. They
found out what things had gone right
and wrong from prior launches, what we
could do to make things better, and
what pitfalls to watch out for. We had
not only the engineering fraternity
but the Mission Hill people, Assembly,
and all divisions trying to talk to
each other and air their dirty laundry
up front. That built the team.
Later on, other groups, like the
truck people, used to needle us: "You
guys having another cake and party?
Another off-site boondoggle?" But even
though you didn't have to believe in
it, it did work and it's showing here.
Would I do it again? No. I plan on
retiring. But I'd advise another
manager to go for it because it's
proven out on the Epsilon.
Epsilon Program Manager at a key
supplier: Companies like AutoCo are so
authoritarian in their nature, that
anything you could do to blast them
off of authoritarianism and start to
move them towards participation and
team work is a good thing. I don't
know about the MIT method, but I see
it as having created a kind of level
of credibility for team work, for the
team effort. They might have done that
using other methods, too, but the main
point for me is that AutoCo is making
the effort.
Internal consultant: I talked to a
couple of folks who were not part of
the learning labs. They might have
gone to an off-site or two. They said,
"We don't do much of the MIT stuff,
except when [the Launch Manager]'s in
the room. [The Launch Manager] will
say, "Where are you on the ladder?"
And people start talking about that
for a while. It's not that they don't
think about it; it's just that they're
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learning organization approach in
general?
Are people more capable of using these
tools than they immediately realize?
focused on their day-to-day jobs.
A couple of the hard-core engineers
say things like, I don't know why you
credit this MIT stuff. This is a
successful program because we set
dates and held them." That's the
engineering mindset.
Learning Labs: How did they contribute to the change
process?
Some of the learning lab participants commented that the changes they saw in
management (particularly the Program Manager, the Launch Manager, and the
Chief Engineering Manager) were much more significant than their own changes
from the learning labs. A few members of this group admitted that their own
positions probably kept them from seeing the effect on themselves as clearly as they
saw the effects on other people. Other participants talked at length about changes in
themselves: an increase in openness, less tendency to blame others (or themselves),
a better understanding of their own biases and mental blinders.
New techniques taught in learning labs that influenced thinking were not as obvious
in anyone's own behaviors as in the behavior of others - particularly visible
others, like their bosses.
Content leader: When people go to
learning labs, there's no light bulb
that goes off: "Aha!" The change stems
from the subtleties that go along with
it. People go back to work thinking
about trying to be more open, more
honest. Maybe they're just more open
to the possibility. They see
themselves interacting differently
with each other. They don't say, "And
now I'm going to use the ladder of
inference," but the tools creep up in
the backs of our minds.
What do these differences mean in trying
to assess the effect of the learning labs?
Is it worth trying to devise an "objective"
way to assess the effects?
Researcher: This is the tough part of
measuring learning. If you learn
something that sort of changes the way
you see the world, it may look like
nothing has really happened. Yet
everything has changed. Paradoxically,
the bigger the change is, the less
visible it may be. The change may take
place in so many subtle ways, so
diffusely, that you can't see it
until, over time, you gradually see a
bigger picture. It's much less visible
than a problem-solving effort, where
you can show visible progress on how
you solved that sucker.
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There was value expressed by participants
in the experiential component of the
learning process. Although managers
and engineers often ask for materials to
read, and don't take time to attend
workshops, having the learning labs
partially facilitated by managers and
focused on current work issues made it
feasible for people to find the time to
participate.
Could AutoCo be expected to become a
"learning organization" in the way it was
described in books and articles?
Were the modifications people made to
the textbook definitions helpful in
adapting the learning materials for the
AutoCo culture?
How might those changes have
influenced the effectiveness of the tools?
This comment was typical. People
appreciated the learning tools, but in the
short exposure they had, they struggled
Launch Manager: You remember how in
the Wizard of Oz film, the scarecrow
got a diploma to legitimize his
learning. Maybe we did something
similar here. Maybe, by bringing in
MIT, we legitimized our focus on
process improvement much more than we
could have done on an ad hoc basis.
Without MIT, I would not know how to
use these powerful tools. I could have
read about them in a book, but without
somebody showing me how we practice
them over time, we would not have
realized the tremendous power that is
in those artifacts.
Process leader: What does it mean to
be a learning organization? I think we
fall short on several dimensions.
When you hear folks describe the
left-hand column, for instance, it's
not even close to a textbook descrip-
tion. They say things like, "If they
can expose their emotional stuff, we
can get to the real truth." As opposed
to how I would describe the left-hand
column: the things that people haven't
said because the environment is not
emotionally or politically safe.
If we don't understand what a tool
really is, how can we use it very
effectively? I may make too big a deal
of the textbook, but I think that we
need to do a better job of helping
people learn what the tools are really
about. MIT and AutoCo are learning
this together; and the difficulty is,
that there's not a lot of patience
around here for struggle. That's not
just true of AutoCo; it's an
organizational reality. MIT needs to
understand that organizations like
AutoCo will fault MIT for not
providing enough support, or for not
teaching us well enough.
I rarely use any of the tools in a
meeting. I wish I could. I think about
them. If I tried to use them in a
meeting, I'd go home with my head in
my hand because I'm not good enough.
I'm not facile enough with archetypes.
The tools you'll see used most are
the communication tools: The ladder of
inference and the left-hand column.
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to use them on line.
Attitude, as well as aptitude, influenced
the effective use of learning tools.
Again, this comment is typical of how
people made linkages between learning
tools and business results. The learning
tools helped, but were diffuse and subtle.
No one, other then the program
managers, attributed the Epsilon
program's achievements to the learning
tools. Yet, people often talked
independently about the efficacy of the
learning tools for product development
management issues and achieving metrics
which were significantly better than
many other vehicle programs.
How could a definitive connection
between learning and results be examined
in this type of setting?
The ladder of inference is helpful,
but unfortunately, we generally use it
during our spare time. If we're in a
meeting and things don't go well, we
don't use the tool then. We walk away
from the meeting, and on the drive
back to the office together in the
car, I might say: "Well, wait a
minute. You know, we're way up here on
assumptions. Let's come back down to
behaviors and try to understand why
so-and-so did that."
Or people may use the tools
sarcastically: "Well, let's get into
our left hand column and see if that
helps, heh, heh, heh." And then they
obviously don't.
In other words, the tools are very
powerful, but until we can use them
accurately and on the spot, we haven't
gotten there. We're still on the
learning curve.
I think the results are better. I
hear both sides. Some folks from the
pilot plant, who built the EPs, say
this is the best product they've had
come down the line. It looks better
than an EP ever has before. Other
people say, "You guys are flat on your
ass. There's holes where they don't
belong [in the auto body] and so on."
In terms of hard measures, the one you
can look at is the percentage of parts
that were ready the day we were
supposed to start building. I've heard
numbers that say we're at 80%. Typical
is more like 40%. If that's accurate,
then we are much better.
Now, is that a result of what we've
done at MIT? It beats me.
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Theme 4: Combining engineering innovation with
human relations: The Harmony Buck
An innovation developed by the Epsilon team, the harmony buck, has become
standard practice at AutoCo. Harmony bucks are a part of most new interior
programs at AutoCo, beginning in 1998 and beyond.
The team's interviews suggest that large scale technical innovations like this one are
possible because of two factors: a willingness to break established methods, and the
opportunity to collaborate across functional lines.
Sidebar: What is a Harmony Buck process?
The Harmony Buck Process
(HBP) is an engineering tool to
assist in design efforts. It is a
"full body" design aid
encompassing the entire car, on
which engineers and designers
can test part prototypes and
diagnose engineering issues
generated after the first set of
prototype parts have been
delivered.
In the past there might have
been many individual "bucks,"
representing different sub-
assemblies of the car. Having a
single "harmony buck" vehicle,
accessible to all team members,
provides a central focal point
for improved coordination
among engineers.
With this early non-driveable
"vehicle", an assessment of
each component and system can
be made before a prototype is
built. Issues such as: basic
design concept inadequacies
("My part doesn't actually work
the way I assumed it would on
paper..."), design
incompatibilities ("My part
clashes with another part..."),
and system interactions ("When
I get these parts all together, it
just doesn't look right or
function right..."), can be
evaluated and corrective actions
taken early. In addition, the
experience assembling and
maintaining the harmony buck
is invaluable at the build site.
On Epsilon, the HBP identified
almost 300 issues, including
about 30 "no-builds" - all
corrected before the actual builds.
At the end of the program, more
than half of the $90 million
provision for changes at launch
time was returned - unused. The
HBP deserves a portion of the
credit for this accomplishment.
The harmony buck story begins with the program managers' efforts at the
beginning of the program to bring people together to set common goals and
objectives, and to establish something intangible - a vision of what it would be
like when they accomplished their program goals.
How do such visioning processes affect
team innovation?
This simple image (the Maytag
Program Manager: In the early stages
of the launch, we asked people at
every level of the team for their
image of an ideal launch. What would
make this launch successful, in their
minds? Ultimately, the team settled on
the image of a Maytag repairman, from
the well-known Maytag commercials.
When the car moved into the assembly
plant, everything should be so well
established that there wouldn't be
anything left to do.
Then we asked ourselves, "Ignoring
the fact that we don't think it would
be possible, and ignoring the problems
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repairman) was used to guide many
complex actions.
Getting approval:
for taking a risk
Making the case to upper management
for additional investment is not always
easily done.
Top management approved the requestfor
a concrete technical innovation, like the
harmony buck, more easily than they
approved a more abstract and general
request for support of learning process
initiatives.
This comment about the Program
Manager's predecessor illustrates the
importance of individual personalities and
management styles. The systematic
nature of the learning efforts with MIT
were only possible, like the harmony
buck, because of the Program Manager's
willingness to support innovations. The
importance of this is not to be missed -
it appears that organizational learning is
built upon individual learning and
individual openness to new ideas.
we anticipate - how would we make this
"Maytag repairman" future come to
pass? We said we would have to
redefine the schedule. Engineering
changes should stop at the point when
prototypes are in progress. During the
period of building prototypes, the
suppliers should be learning how to
make the parts. Then during the stages
of pilot production, the assembly
people should learn how to assemble
the car.
By the time we got to Job One, we
hoped, all that would be left would be
training the assembly people to
produce the car faster. Everything
depended on setting things up so the
engineers wouldn't make changes after
the prototype phase. But how could we
accomplish that?
Building confidence to make a case
Engineer: The harmony buck story
started back in June 1989, at the very
beginning of the Epsilon project. The
question came through our department:
What would it take for us to meet and
exceed the standards for components of
the past? This was the most complex
car that we had ever done. It was
pushing the edge of so many different
component technologies that the
electrical community was very nervous
about it up front. We recommended a
full harmony buck from engine to rear;
the idea went up to the program
manager at the time, [the Program
Manager's] predecessor. He was not
very interested, but some of the other
team leaders were. They realized the
impact the harmony buck would have on
the quality numbers. Different
engineers from different parts of the
car began to push for this thing.
Later, after [the Program Manager]
was there, there was a meeting of
supervisors, managers, and executives
at world headquarters. The senior
managers asked again: How would we
raise or exceed past standards? Once
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again, the harmony buck answer came
out.
Researcher: One of the engineers who
initiated the harmony buck told me
that he would never have had the
audacity to propose it, except for the
encouragement he had received during
the previous months at Epsilon. [The
Program Manager] had been saying:
"Look we're not going to beat up on
you. We really want to know what you
are thinking."
Chief Engineering Manager: We
presented the idea in a meeting with
our Vice President. We said, "We think
we can save money downstream by
finding the problems earlier. But we
can't tell you exactly how much it is
going to save. You are going to have
to trust us on that, and put up about
one million dollars up front."
If there had not been a cushion, would
the harmony buck have been approved?
Should it have been approved, if there
were no cushion?
Approval required a personal
commitment by the Program Manager to
"take $4 million out of the provision for
changes. "
He turned to the controller and
said, "I think I am projecting to
under-run my budget by about $2
million, so let's go do this."
Vice President: I am pleased that I
approved it. The idea was to make sure
that parts fit well before they ever
showed up in a prototype, or later in
Assembly operations. If you had a
problem you could go back and, with a
master grid, finesse your design until
it fit. The buck was over budget but
the team found a way to offset it. And
it was a good idea. It was probably
one of the very positive things that
the team came up with. They committed
to downstream savings in change count
and PCR provisions which they wouldn't
need. The first time through would be
more expensive, but we thought it was
right for quality and I think the cars
turned out very well.
Assembly Launch Leader: The harmony
buck let the engineer fit a wood mock-
up or whatever of his part onto that
buck before we ever had a physical
unit going down the line. The engineer
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could try it out and see: Would it
really work? How would it package with
other components?
We proved out so many parts on the
harmony buck before we ever built our
first unit. Usually, in other
launches, by the time you get to 1PP
the engineers are still going back and
changing the entire part again. But
the parts that were in our car in
early 1993 were pretty much the same
as in the package now [in September
1994]. Certainly, a lot of changes
happened. Some of them you would see,
some of them you would not. But the
basic vehicle layout, including the
wiring, did not change a whole lot.
Implementation reveals resistance within the team
Approval by top management did not mean that the innovation was supported by
everyone involved.
The idea of yet another prototype was
interpreted by some people as meaning
more work, taking more time, and
costing more money. It meant changing
the way things were done, and there was
resistance.
Over time people found that the harmony
buck helped, and were more overtly
supportive of the effort.
Engineer: At first, there was an
internal struggle. The current buck
program was a current Epsilon body
with a new front end and front
underbody. We were looking to expand
that to a full new body and new
interior. The people responsible for
the front end resisted, I think,
because we took the buck away from
them for a month and rebuilt it from
scratch. "Don't interfere with my
job," they said. "I don't see any
benefit in doing this anyway. I don't
want to have anything to do with it."
Every day somebody would tell us,
"This is just not worth the money. I
don't know how you're going to do it."
But those of us who had a clear
vision of what it would do kept
pushing until we got it through. We
had to keep telling ourselves that it
would work. We knew it would pay off
in the end. We got into a few meetings
about the buck. At one meeting, [the
Chief Engineering Manager] said, "No,
go ahead. Go on with your program.
You'll get your body back soon enough
and it won't lose you that much time."
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I think that was a big turning point.
Does this comment suggest that AutoCo Content leader: If something hasn't
people need to push themselves beyond been done before, we tend to be
the comfort zone - beyond what they negative about a new idea. I heard
think may be realistic? some people say, "Why do we need
another prototype? We already have
If so, how can AutoCo's management enough prototypes." Well, we haven't
systems and culture reinforce peoplefor implemented a bad idea on the Epsilon
this? Could reward systems create program yet.
incentives that lead to new behaviors?
Engineer: The harmony buck was a great
tool. It was AutoCo's first harmony
The harmony buck was linked by many buck. It allowed a total car to be
with achieving better results on reviewed up front before we built the
subsequent prototype builds. cars. Previously, the company had used
partial bucks. By having a full car
package buck, all the engineers could
understand the interactions between
their part and the surrounding parts.
That allowed us to build VPs on the
assembly line - which had never been
done before. Typically all the VPs are
built off line because the parts are
not ready enough to go into a car and
maintain line speed.
The harmony buck as a communication tool
The technical innovation of the harmony buck served as a social innovation. People
needed to meet around the physical buck, and these activities created opportunities
for communication and collective problem solving.
The person hired to be in charge of the
buck was able to bring in additional
innovations.
How can companies like AutoCo
cultivate and reward these in-house
"pollinators" of ideas? Or is special
cultivation of them necessary?
Content leader: We hired a manager
from outside the team to take charge
of the harmony buck. He developed a
lot of processes that we had never
used before [involving computers and
checking points]. He got a lot of
cooperation from just about every
group in the company, but it was
largely a one-man effort. I hate to
say this, but I don't think that we
could have found anybody on the inside
who would have been willing to take as
many chances with as many new ideas
and processes. He really showed us a
lot of stuff.
Engineer: We hired outside prototype
shops, instead of the suppliers, to
make many of the prototype components
for the harmony buck, because they
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The physical nature of a buck that was
continually updated provided a place for
people to meet and talk, as well as test
out the compatibility of their parts and
subassemblies.
Coordination became a criticalfactor in
making the buck successful.
Did the white board in the harmony buck
room help people in voicing their
concernsformally as well? The record
number of change requests (see Freezing
and reducing the change requests, page
79), may have been exacerbated by this
board
While a diffuse and subtle learning effort
might not be linked to business results,
an innovation like a harmony buck,
which was made possible in an
environment created to be conducive to
learning, is associated with financial
results.
could do it more quickly. When we
started getting those prototype parts
in, it was a big turning point. You
could see the interest ramp up. We had
to fight to schedule time for people
to get in there to see their parts.
Once we started the buck build,
people were in and out of that room
frequently. It was a good place to
resolve a lot of problems because
again, we made it accessible. [One
content leader] stressed that to us:
"Let the people get at it. If they
want to call you up and come on down,
don't resist." You could go down there
anytime in the day and there'd be from
10 to 15 people around this thing, all
doing something different. We made
sure we set up a process where someone
could easily change a part. "Just let
us know about it," we said.
Program Manager: When we started the
harmony buck process, we added a
whiteboard to the Buck room. Whenever
someone found a problem on the harmony
buck, it was written on that board.
And the rule was that you couldn't
ever erase something from the board
unless you had placed a concern number
behind it. Once you make it a concern,
everyone can think about it: "Now, how
might that affect me?" Everybody can
work on it together.
Content leader: After the harmony buck
was set up, the engineers loved it.
They were swarming over it. We found
all kinds of problems, way in advance
of even the first mechanical or EP. We
paid that $2 million back in a week or
two, finding concerns early enough
that we avoided major expenses in
retooling. This was probably one of
the big reasons we have underrun our
investment target.
Expanding the collaborators
As the first harmony buck evolved into a more complete (EP) build, the
coordinators deliberately set up the car's process to involve all of the constituents,
including the Mission Hill assembly people and suppliers, in the design of the car
from the beginning. Suppliers could see problems before they reached assembly.
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Suppliers met with assembly people at the buck, and depended less on telephone
calls to one another.
Assembly Launch Leader: In the past,
assembly was the neck at the end of
the funnel. Whatever transpired early
on in design and engineering,
eventually gets into the assembly
plant and we have to assemble all
these dreams. And they don't always
fit. With the harmony buck, we moved
the neck of the funnel up into the
prototype stage. When we found
problems, we called in the suppliers
and told them where their mistakes
were and what we required so that we
could assemble the thing. We did this
up front; we didn't wait six months to
find these problems. To me, that was
one of the biggest keys.
Are people more effectively involved if Engineer, car programs management: Two
there is an upfront communication/ guys who worked with us actually
planningprocess? worked for the supplier that did the
sheet metal body. They just stayed on
site for a year, which is very
uncommon, and they got very familiar
with the car.
When we reached-the EP phase, we
wanted to develop the build sequence
basically as if we were running it
down the line. Those of us who were
managing the harmony buck insisted
that the engineers and suppliers come
to Roxbury and install their parts. We
told them: "Come and do your own part.
Try everything out yourself."
So we scheduled times. We started
with the wiring guys - engineers and
suppliers. We had planned a half day
for them, but they begged and pleaded
for us to give them more time, because
they started to find things that
wouldn't have permitted us to build
the car.
For example, a harness of 120 wires
hanging out the door. There was no way
to loop it around and attach it; we
had to rework all the parts. If we
hadn't noticed it on the harmony buck,
it would have meant boxing up all the
parts for the EP build, stopping the
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build, and shipping the parts back to
the supplier.
How much time would that have
taken? How much money would we have
lost? I don't know how to quantify it,
but we found quite a few of these
problems. We put together a list of
the significant stoppages that we
averted because of this program. We
tried to quantify this list as well,
but we could not come up with a dollar
value.
Program Manager's boss: The whole
process was built around having the
individual engineer who was
responsible for a component or a
system go in and actually participate
in assembling that component. It gave
the engineers a lot more familiar-
ization than they would have had
otherwise with how their parts fit
within the vehicle.
Vice President: It allowed the
engineer to check the finish, or the
robustness of the fastener. Could he
jerk it? Would it rattle? It allowed
them to look at wiring to determine
routing robustness. It wasn't a
prototype that was here for three days
and then off on another test; it was
there all the time. If you had a
problem, you could go make another
part, and put it back on again.
Chief Engineering Manager: It was at
either the EP or the VP harmony buck
that the President came out to review
the status of the program. I remember
that he talked with us while sitting
in the back of the harmony buck. He
thought it was great to see this level
of parts that you could look at for
fit and finish issues, and to get the
hard stuff out of the way before you
cut production tools.
Content leader: We used it as our
The buck was almost institutionalized by golden car. We kept it up to date. We
the team, as this comment about it being put all the VP components on the EP,
the "golden car" implied and proved those out ahead of time.
This ensured much more up front
quality of the electrical system and
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we're continuing to use the VP car
right now [September 1994].
The success of the harmony buck process
for Epsilon did not always attract
admiration from other program managers.
Some had to be told by the Vice
President to go to take a look at what
Epsilon was doing.
Could it be that professional jealousy or
competition among program managers
limited recognition for this innovation?
Engineer in Program Management: It was
a phenomenal success. That was evident
in just the amount of attention it got
from other programs. People from the
Omega program, Kappa, one of the truck
programs - everyone was dying to get
in to see this thing. It was like a
miracle we'd pulled off. And it really
wasn't that hard to do. It was just
common sense when you really think
about it.
The harmony buck was integrated with other practices that opened technical
communication with outsiders. Before each of the three builds the team held a big
suppliers' meeting. They also had a process called "Must-See-Before": engineers
had to visit the suppliers' plants and see the parts before the build. Several
engineers suggested that these two processes made an enormous difference.
The second harmony buck: Approval and decline
A subsequent harmony buck was not as widely successful in terms of producing
new insights as the first buck had been. The lower level of success of the second
buck raises issues about whether the first buck raised expectations, found the
problems to be identified by this innovation, or whether the social innovation for
meeting and talking around this second buck wasn't there the.way it had been with
the first buck. The second buck was less of a "big deal" - it was a way of "doing
business" for the team, rather than an innovation.
Can the success of the harmony buck be
attributed to the team's learning efforts?
The quotes thus far show that the link is
subtle: At every stage, the buck was
successful to the extent that people felt
free to raise questions with each other,
suppliers, and assembly people.
The second buck was more for the
transition to assembly, yet the concept of
a buck was more appropriate and
innovative for engineering design.
Engineer: We had to have a second
meeting with Vice President to ask for
additional money to continue the
program. We found we couldn't quantify
exactly how much money the Buck had
saved us in time, labor, changing
tools, getting parts, etc.
So instead, we walked [the Vice
President] through the program. We got
stories from every engineer: "Here's
what we started with. Here's how we
built the car." And we had a board
full of photos to show the process:
"Here's the engineer putting his own
part on the car three months ahead of
schedule." The engineer wouldn't be
standing back, watching an hourly guy
hammering the part on the car because
it didn't work; the engineer would be
putting the part on the car.
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"The benefit is just phenomenal,"
we said. "We know the EP came off so
smoothly in large part because of
this. We'd like to continue it through
Job One. Doesn't it make sense?" They
couldn't argue with it. He agreed, and
they gave us funding to let us keep
going.
Engineer, Car Programs Management: I
don't think they were able to generate
the same amount of information in the
second phase of the harmony buck. They
were not able to generate the same
interest and involvement that we had
gotten before.
When communication broke down, the advantages from the harmony buck also
seemed to diminish. According to some interviews, that communication breakdown
happened in this final stage. There was less emphasis after the VP build on drawing
engineers in to test their components on the buck, and making them feel as if it were
"their buck." The first harmony buck identified many issues, and because it was so
effective, there were fewer surprises on the second buck. However, the harmony
buck process is one of the most generally agreed upon "noticeable results" from this
program (as listed on page 87).
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Theme 5: Partnerships
Several Epsilon efforts could be seen as attempts to develop infrastructure to
support communication and partnership between functions. Two efforts stood out
in participants' minds:
* The market research clinic expanded the team's opportunities to learn from
customers and dealers, and to pursue cross-functional conversations.
* The collocation effort showed how physically changing the infrastructure
is not sufficient in itself. It's also necessary to develop new habits and
attitudes to help people get the most value from collocation.
(Another infrastructural event, which is not covered in detail in this Learning
History, was the three-day off-site meeting in 1993, where 150 Epsilon team
members gathered to create a shared vision for the program.)
The market research clinic
The engineers designing the Epsilon were exposed to customers early in the
development process. The impact of this effort was reflected in the interviews:
Body engineering manager: Most of the
engineers are young and have no plan
to ever drive a [luxury vehicle like
the] Epsilon. It's not their type of
car. Their mindset is oriented to
[lower cost passenger cars]. How can
you feel a certain allegiance to
making this the best car in the world
if it's just another car to you?
Eight of the predecessor cars to the new
Epsilon were obtained so that team
members could drive them overnight and
on weekends. The cars were continually
in use for the next two years.
The early market research clinics, an
innovation from the Epsilon team, and
use of luxury cars by engineers
represented ways that team members
could learn directly about what they were
to create.
Yet, none of the people designing
the cars ever drive any of those cars.
Only the senior management types drive
them. I don't know if it went
anywhere, but [the Program Manager]
was going to get a fleet of luxury
cars for people on the team to
experience, to get a sense of what
this car was all about.
Launch Manager: After we go through a
number of ideation sketches and start
honing in on some favorite themes, we
usually go out and do some market
research. We invite people to sit
behind a mock-up of the interior and
the trunk. In the past, we would have
had a market research expert create a
qualitative report. The bosses would
have read it and told the engineers
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what to change.
Instead, we had our background in
vision work. We had asked ourselves:
"What do we want this car to be and
how do we want to engineer it?" The
best way to learn, in that context, is
to take our 40 engineering team
leaders and have them spend a week
talking to the customers. "Why do you
drive what you drive? What would you
like from your next luxury car? What
do you think about the price? What do
you think we should do?" The specific
answers were important, but less
important than making our engineers
feel connected to the customer. So
when they're engineering those cars,
they remember John, Bill, Mary, or
whomever they talked to. They have a
face in their minds; not just an
engineering drawing.
Interviewees often talked about the
primary benefit of exposing engineers to
customers. What about the secondary
benefit of the forty engineers and
marketing people traveling together and
talking to one another about design
attributes?
Market research liaison: They took the
Epsilon to a market research meeting
way earlier than I would have done. At
the time, I fought them on this event.
I wanted valid research and I knew the
engineers weren't trained to do that.
But in retrospect, it was brilliant.
The engineers couldn't have gotten any
of the feeling they got by looking at
a video or reading a book. I thought
that was extremely valuable. That was
the first time I had seen that done.
They also wanted us to have dealers
and media present at the research and
that worried me a lot. It's really a
risk, because the dealers are very
influential. Had they disliked the
car, it would have really hurt our
launch. Had the media disliked it,
that would have hurt us too.
It turned out that the dealers and
media made suggestions. I found out at
the launch meeting yesterday that the
team had responded to each one of the
suggestions. When we bring the car
close to market at the end of this
year, I can go back to the dealers and
say: "When you told us this, this is
how we responded." Suddenly the
dealers and key members of the media
EPSILON Learning History * Theme 5: Partnerships 
Page 62
SILON ear i  istory Theme 5: Partnerships Page 62
are a part of the team.
Engineer: I went on the market
research clinic in April 1992. I
thought it was great that they let
engineers go, because we got a chance
to talk to the customers. People were
complaining about sluggish performance
in the way the vehicle felt. From the
powertrain area we already knew that
it might be substandard, and we had
proposed fixes and they were gonna
cost X amount of dollars. It was hard
to sell that point to the program
people, but after the second clinic I
think the point came across. We
weren't just talking out of our hats;
this was real. When a customer agrees
it's a lot easier to say, "Hey, maybe
he's right."
Market research liaison: The Epsilon
team members always attend research,
whether it's theirs or ours. You
expect them to attend their research,
but they attend our research. They
want to be involved in the launch.
They want to be involved in the
delivery. They want to have their
people learn for the next program.
Once the engineers had met and worked with marketing people, they maintained the
contact and interest well into program development activities.
Collocation: Opening a new realm of issues
Collocation is not as simple as merely putting everyone under one roof. Because of
timing, Epsilon had not been designated to be collocated; thus, collocation came late
to the Epsilon project. It was still a relatively new practice at AutoCo. It might not
have been introduced, people agreed, if the learning organization ideas had not
reinforced the need people felt for intensive collaboration across functional lines.
Epsilon approached collocation a little differently than other teams. Instead of being
seen as a cross-functional team because members were collocated, collocation was
seen (from inside the team) as a first step. Once collocation began, people were
responsible for coordinating old loyalties, and protecting new ones, in
unprecedented ways. In retrospect, many people on the Epsilon team expressed a
wish that the collocation process had taken place earlier, and had included
representatives from more functional areas.
Content leader: Some of the value of
collocation is [intangible]. But there
is a real advantage to being in the
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Epsilon was one of the first teams to be
collocated. AutoCo has learnedfrom
these earlier experiences that collocation
is effective and full collocation is
valuable.
Collocation provided an opportunity for
improving how people worked together.
However, as this quote illustrates, other
factors were neededfor people to benefit
from their proximity with one another.
People talked in the interviews about the
effect of collocation in much the same
way that they talked about the benefits of
the learning labs. Could collocation
have been effective without the work on
"trust" and "openness?" Could trust and
openness have been developed without
the reinforcementfrom collocation?
To what extent were team members
affected by the ability and influence of
the team managers to get top
management to support their requestfor
collocation, despite the fact that it wasn't
planned or budgeted?
same room with other people. If you
need to ask someone a question and you
have to call and they're not there,
and they call and you're not there,
that can go on for days.
Engineer: The politics disappear. You
don't have to go through another layer
of management to resolve an issue. You
just walk over and have a one-on-one
discussion. It also helped to have the
major suppliers on site during launch:
Prince, the body shop people,
Motorola, etc.
Team leader: When you see somebody
every day, just by human nature, you
build a bond because you're in each
other's offices all the time. You just
become friends. Trust-building is
really encouraged by this collocation.
Content leader: However, a lot of our
problem is not related to proximity;
it's the chimneys. We started buying
donuts and coffee on Wednesday morning
and having the team leaders hang
around for people to bring problems
to. That was not really working.
People came in for donuts and coffee,
but they still didn't say what was on
their mind.
Chief Program Engineer: When someone
is afraid to tell you that he's got a
problem, it doesn't matter if he's
sitting in the next cubbyhole or
sitting on the other side of town,
he's not going to tell you. If he is
willing to tell you, there's an
advantage to being together because a
lot of time is spent in the halls
talking together, instead of formal
meetings. There's a great power in
collocation, but collocation doesn't
fix the lack of openness and honesty.
Chief Engineering Manager: It was a
late collocation. There were a lot of
people resisting it. The program is
already off and running, they said. We
can't collocate every team. Maybe this
is one we don't collocate.
In fact, we never really did
EPSILON Learning History * Theme 5: Partnerships 
* 
Page 64
Theme 5: Partnerships Page 64ILON earning History
assemble a fully collocated team. Our
team was halfway in between. Those who
felt strongly that it would be
beneficial moved in. Those who didn't
want to move resisted. But I noticed
that those members who were collocated
got things done faster and smoother.
Collocation pulls some people together,
and still leaves some people out. Does
the benefit from collocation depend upon
the interdependence of the work of the
people that are being put together?
If people didn't see the interdependence
among particular teams, for example
sheetmetal with trim with vibration
teams, it was easy to miss the value that
collocation provided.
As with the other innovations in this
program, there was initial resistance by
both those whose approval was needed
(top management) and by those who were
affected (engineers).
And, as in the other cases, people only
recognize the benefits afterwards.
What is it that leads program managers
to continue despite the resistance they
encounter at all levels?
Content leader: Collocation hasn't
helped in any substantial way. When
[the Program Manager] was trying to
pull all this collocation together, we
resisted until we were basically
kicked out of our building. We came
over here because we had no other
place to sit.
The reason I resisted was this: 90%
of my parts in body structures are
made by Metal Stamping Operations.
Those suppliers were right in our old
building and sat next to my engineers.
They were the tooling experts. When
somebody asks us for a change, we have
to ask an expert: "Is this feasible?
Can you make it?" Now, after
collocation, that tooling expert is a
15-minute drive away.
Team leader: I was .in the experimental
vehicle garage when the team
collocated. It was interesting because
most of the vehicle development people
did not want to collocate. They were
set in their ways; they had the EV
garage, and all their creature
comforts. Who wanted to go to another
building? From my perspective I saw a
lot of resentment. This was not going
to work.
But over the last couple of years
I've seen a lot of positive changes.
My manager asked vehicle development
[in summer 1994] how many people, if
they had to do it over again, would
prefer to have stayed in the garage. I
think about 2/3 of the people wanted
to be here. That proved that in the
end, the team cooperation that you get
when you're all under one roof, along
with the dedicated facilities that we
had, really worked out well.
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Theme 6: Process innovation in the context of a
large organization
In creating a new approach to managing the Epsilon team, one deliberately different
from traditional AutoCo management culture, the leaders came to feel isolated from
the senior levels of the AutoCo system. The nature of competition at this level left
the Epsilon program manager feeling isolated. The launch manager, while he
received many inquiries from others as to what Epsilon was doing, felt the inquiries
were superficial because most people appeared to be waiting to see how things
would turn out.
From team leaders' point of view, senior managers sometimes applauded them,
sometimes supported them, sometimes ignored them, and sometimes invalidated
their efforts. Team managers tried to explain their approach, but they did not gain
sustained interest or attention from senior managers. The Epsilon team coped with
their position as innovators by assuming that their excellent results would make
them popular, influential and acceptable, legitimizing their alternative methods.
Unintentionally, this became a strategy of isolation. Yet Epsilon was, from the
beginning, inherently dependent upon the larger AutoCo system.
This section of the learning history shows how an innovative team like Epsilon
needs an advocacy from above that fulfills the spirit, not just the letter, of
mentoring. Since their work, by definition, challenges the established rules of the
game, the team needs help anticipating potential frustrations and roadblocks, in time
to find strategies for managing them well. They need safe, open communication
channels for raising difficult questions - and committed advisors who can help
stop them from going off into organizational dead ends. In the end, the tension
raised by an effective change effort represents opportunities - for improvement
within the team and in the larger system. It is a challenging task to take advantage of
these opportunities, but we hope future teams can build effectively upon Epsilon's
experiences.
There is a temptation to view this story as a "David vs. Goliath" narrative - "the
innovative team versus the rest of the organization." However, that is just one
perspective on a fairly complex and multi-faceted story. In reality, nearly every
participant felt that Epsilon accomplished a great deal but could have achieved much
more.
The Epsilon team leaders explicitly hoped that they might recreate their positive
team experiences and results in other AutoCo settings, and were disappointed not to
be given that opportunity. Others in the company felt that the difficulties perceived
by Epsilon team leaders were just that - perceived difficulties. They felt that
Epsilon was appropriately supported and nurtured, like all AutoCo teams.
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Positioning the purpose of the team
Before his assignment as the Epsilon program manager, the Program Manager held
leadership positions with other vehicle programs, including the Planning Manager
for the original AutoCo Theta Program (see footnote on the Theta Program, page
19). These experiences strongly influenced his goals for the Epsilon team.
Program Manager: I wanted to accomplish
three items on this launch.
The priority of these goals were
consistent with what was expected The first was to make the car as
by top management at AutoCo. good as I could get it, given the totalby top management at AutoCo.
program constraints.
The second was to run an orderly,
"no-surprises" program.
The Program Manager's goals did not
explicitly include impacting the larger
organization - but is it inevitable that
anyone who succeeds at process
innovation will want to see that success
replicated on a larger scale?
The management style of another
process innovator influenced the
Program Manager.
People often talk about what its
like to be on a "great" team; it
seems to be a basic human
experience which people then often
seek to replicate.
The third was to take a better
approach in managing people in the
product development process.
What I really wanted to accomplish
was to build a team like [the Theta car
manager] built on the Theta in 1984. I
was on that team. He didn't know any of
the tools or theories that we used on
Epsilon, but he loved us. That was
important! He created an atmosphere
such that no matter how he yelled at
you and what he did; it didn't matter
because he loved you. And I thought if
I could ever build a team like that,
that would be the crowning touch of my
career. But I wanted to create that
spirit through a reproducible process:
one that we could spread to other teams
without relying on personalities.
Those three main topics are exactly
what I described to the team at our
very first meeting. I never changed
those goals.
Engaging senior management
In retrospect, some critics of the Epsilon project have suggested that senior
management should have been more involved from the beginning. There should
have been more attempts to help senior managers understand the theory, tools, and
process associated with the five disciplines of a learning organization (see Senge,
The Fifth Discipline, 1990).5
5 This learning history is focused on the Epsilon project, its learning initiative, and the issues Epsilon's
efforts raises within AutoCo. In reading this document a number of people have surfaced questions
regarding the relationship of the Epsilon team with senior level managers and the structure and
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As early as the Project Engagement Clinic6 , in September of 1991, when the
Epsilon learning effort began, this problem was discussed. Chris Argyris,
Professor at the Harvard Business School and an advisor with the MIT group,
cautioned that the strategy of excluding senior management from direct involvement
might not be effective in the long run. The Program Manager and the Launch
Manager were aware of this problem. They said that AutoCo culture generally
valued results over theory. They felt they could not effectively include senior
managers in their effort, or even talk much about the MiT "learning" theory, until
they had some tangible results to demonstrate. This put an extra burden on the
team, because if results failed to measure up, it would call their approach with MIT
into question.
The strategy that was broadly advocated
at AutoCo was to take the risk by trying
a new approach, and justify it
retrospectively with the results it
produced
That early decision, which drew a
"curtain of silence" around the Epsilon
team, may have been more damaging in
the end than team members expected. Of
course, it will never be known what
would have happened if the team had
optedfor a more visible approach, and
had not moved forward until senior
managers understood and accepted the
new way of working. It might have
limited the amount of innovation that
was allowed.
When is the most appropriate time to
engage senior management?
What dilemmas are set up for managers
when in order to get support for trying
something new, like process
innovations, they have to point to hard
results, yet in order to produce better
hard results, they have to try something
Program Manager (at project definition
clinic): There have been lots of
studies in the company in the past that
have highlighted the fact that there's
a lot of fear in the organization....
Nothing changes [peoples' minds] unless
you have data ["noticeable results"].
Researcher: But this is not a problem
of data. You will never be able to
present hard evidence of a causal link
[between your innovations and the
positive results]. It's epistemological
impossible.
Launch Manager (later): We were asked:
"How much success can you have without
involving senior management?" We
admitted we didn't know. We were asked
whether we would be prepared to involve
them at some point in time. I think our
answer was that when we thought we were
ready we would be prepared.
Program Manager's boss: I think one of
the reasons that we didn't spend more
time trying to get management support
is because this process was "soft". As
I look at this project and other
similar projects within the Company,
the people involved are clearly very,
support of the MIT research effort in engaging executives. The Epsilon managers were unable to get
top management involved in learning project issues. The team requested, several times, that the OLC
help them design a process of engaging the larger system. Involving busy executives, working with a
research group in engaging executives, as well as the efforts of the learning history process itself in
capturing and addressing these issue is the subject of a subsequent research document.
6 The project engagement clinic occurs as part of the process of starting a research project. A set of
interviews were conducted with managers on the team to surface known issues. A document with a
summary of these interviews was then read by the MIT researchers and Epsilon managers before
attending the clinc. The clinic provided an opportunity to test the ability and willingness of managers
to engage with challenging issues of the kind that surface through learning initiatives. An important
issue raised in the clinic was the implications of conducting research while trying to accomplish
business objectives. For more details and list of questions on clinic, see page 4.
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new? very large supporters of the process.
Our approach was to let the results
speak for themselves basically and not
go out and try to preach the process
because it could be viewed as soft.
Program Manager: I tried to be the
buffer for the team. I said, "Wait
until the results come in. When they
see the results, they're going to start
asking "How did you do that?" Then
they'll be ready to listen".
But when results began to show up - as new records of achievement for the
program - it was still difficult to talk about the learning effort. Achievements were
not acknowledged in the ways that Epsilon team leaders had hoped for. And the
link between process work and engineering results seemed to go unrecognized.
Senior managers who preside over
an innovative pilot project need an
effective way to educate themselves
in the process that the team
develops.
The Vice President's response was
not seen by the Program Manager
as an endorsement, but rather as a
missed opportunity to see or accept
the linkage between the learning
approach and product development
accomplishments.
Program Manager: I brought the team
leaders in [for a one-hour presentation
to a group of senior managers,
including Vice President, on the value
of the learning effort]. We told them
all the things we had accomplished,
what we had done to accomplish them,
and how much poorer we believed our
results would be if we hadn't tried to
do it a new way.
Two things seemed to make an impact
on [the Vice President]. One of our
engineers' stories dealt with immense
reductions in development time because
of what she had used from the learning
lab.
Secondly, my perception was that he
never got the chance to hear firsthand
stories like this. They were always
filtered through so many levels of
management that this was a rare
occasion to hear directly from the
people who did something. I think that
had an impact in itself. And we got him
to agree to money for more training.
Nonetheless, at the end of that
meeting he told us we could keep
working on this stuff. But we shouldn't
let it get in the way of our real jobs.
After that comment, I didn't think I
had a prayer of convincing [the Vice
President] other than with hard data
and results.
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Evaluating Epsilon: Miscommunications and
misunderstandings
After the team leaders fell into a pattern of relative detachment from the larger
system, there were recurring misunderstandings. In some cases, Epsilon team
leaders thought the larger system was micromanaging them from above (as they did
with other car programs): dictating requirements that didn't really apply to Epsilon
(they thought) because the new management practices made those requirements
obsolete. Other car programs also thought the requirements were obsolete,
however, for lack of better measures, Epsilon and others continued to comply with
convential reporting requirements.
At the same time, some of the senior leaders perceived the Epsilon team as
withdrawing into its own "true believer" approach - as if Epsilon leaders felt that
they knew how to achieve results that the rest of the AutoCo organization did not.
To senior leaders, the jury was still out on Epsilon's "unique successes." They did
not know whether it would do better than other, more conventional teams.
These misunderstandings seemed like separate events, but over time they built upon
each other. Epsilon leaders began to feel that the system would not let them
communicate their ideas up the hierarchy. Their attempts to tell top managers did
not meet with the enthusiastic reception they had hoped for. Instead, they were told
not to let these efforts "get in the way" of their real jobs of producing a car. Some
within product development worried that the Epsilson team might be falling prey to
"group think."
Internal consultant: I got the
impression that [the Program Manager]
and [the Launch Manager] were saying to
themselves, "We did everything right.
Everybody at AutoCo should be pleased.
When they see the results, they'll
knock the doors down trying to learn
how to do what we did." I'm sure I
shared in some of that attitude myself.
But in retrospect, that was a naive
approach to the world. If we expected
results and teamwork, in themselves, to
communicate our message to the rest of
the company, then we were setting
ourselves up for disappointment. And we
have to be careful not to blame
everyone else for not recognizing us in
the way we hoped they would.
Change, by its nature, is painful.
It means going against the flow from
beginning to end. And results are
always more ambiguous than we'd like.
Perhaps we should have prepared for the
ambivalence that outsiders would feel,
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and adopted less of a missionary
attitude about what we were doing. On
the other hand, if we hadn't taken that
attitude, we might never have begun the
learning effort.
As the Epsilon managers and engineers
learned to be more open and direct
among themselves about the problems
they faced, they began to practice some
of that same behavior with their bosses
and others outside that team.
Program Manager (in an interview in
mid-1993): I have taken to discussing
problems openly with my boss and the
Vice Presidents. In one meeting, I told
an-Executive Vice President that there
weren't enough resources on this
program from body engineering. I showed
him how that might jeopardize the
program, how we were trying to recover,
and what the risks were.
I felt the VP wanted to hear,
instead, how we would make it with the
head count we had. A year or two
before, I would have told him what I
thought was politically wise to tell
him. This time, I was telling him what
to realistically expect up front.
He seemed to think I was being
uncooperative. But other people in the
room - the Vice Presidents from
chimneys I had to work with - responded
more positively. Later, when I called
them and said, "Hey, I need a hand,"
they helped in a way that they've never
helped before. I think it's because
they remembered me as having talked to
them candidly.
Changing in a larger organizational
system seems to require both an
awareness that individuals are part of a
system and that changes need to occur at
individual and organizational levels.
What conditions are requiredfor
individuals to change and behave
differently? What changes in
organizational conditions are requiredfor
others to try new behaviors?
Why is it a risk to be open in a large
firm like AutoCo? What are the
implications for improvement if being
As it happens, we did make up the
problems with the existing head count -
because of process things we did that
had nothing to do with what the rest of
the company was doing. In essence, we
did what that Executive Vice President
wanted us to do in a way he didn't
expect.
If I were 35 years old and worried
about getting promoted, I couldn't have
taken those risks. I guess I'm old
enough and I've been around long
enough, and some of the things I was
doing with MIT were changing my
mindset. The change wasn't with them.
The change came from within me.
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open is risky, and only a few people
take those risks?
How might creating conditions of
openness and risk-taking in one
group, within in a large
organization, be interpreted by
others in that organization?
But can you find a way to talk
about individual change without
seeming like a "cult" follower?
Does the language that was used to
describe the tools for learning
become a barrierfor others when it
isn't understood?
When the orientation for managing
the product development process
shifts from managing and
controlling to learning and
coaching, how does using a new
language to describe these activities
affect other people's perceptions of
them?
The learning approach was based on
a philosophy of openness and
acceptance of differences.
What happens when the patterns
associated with traditional
management process, that of seeing
behaviors as either right or wrong,
slips into how a learning approach
is practiced?
Vice President: I felt a bit like "the
outsider." It became almost cult-like
to me. People would sit in meetings,
look each other in the eye, and talk
about the "ladder of inference."
Meanwhile, I was trying to run the
business. I had a lot of tough
decisions, and I was very tight on my
time.
It almost seemed that the tool
became more important than the end
result. The team became so process-
driven, so mechanistic, so much like
disciples of Peter Senge, that I think
it got in the way of what they were
trying to do. I know the team would
disagree, but that was the view from
the outside. There was critical time
spent away from work in some cases.
When I was there as a senior person
I got the impression that they were
letting the process overwhelm the
solution of their problems: "Make sure
we follow this process, so we're aware
of what we're doing." I think that's
dangerous when that happens. That is my
only personal experience with the whole
thing. To an outside observer, if you
weren't part of it, and if you didn't
buy into all this, you were wrong and
they were right.
I think that's where training can go
bad. If you're going to expect
performance changes or behavioral
changes from the people you interface
with, then you better make sure those
people go through the interface, the
process with you, at least so you
understand it. Had I known it was going
to be as broad and deeply spiritual as
it seemed to turn out to be, then I
should have been a part of it. We
shouldn't have done it unless we all
agreed to go through it together.
Did I ever call [the Program
Manager] on this? I don't recall any
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specific discussion.
Learning approaches are based on developing a level of skill in conversation and
inquiry. What happens when people in other parts of the organization, those that
are relied on for support and approval of resources, have not had exposure to
learning ideas or an opportunity to learn those new skills?
Implementing the new CR policy
Traditionally, AutoCo programs tend to be judged by the numbers. Ultimately, the
final measure of success is in the market place, but prior to launch, product
development progress is closely monitored. Metrics are the major form of
communications between program teams and senior management; the major way for
senior managers to see if a program is meeting objectives and "under control."
When a team innovates to improve the process, it changes the rules, as Epsilon did.
This stymies the rest of the organization's ability to measure the team's progress. If
the rules are truly changed, then traditional measurements lose their effectiveness.
These traditional measurements were ways to check the progress of the program at
intermediate points in time - a way of being able to predict how the final product
would turn out. The Program Manager and the Launch Manager assumed that if
they had the people process right, some intermediate metrics would be spectacular,
while other metrics would become less relevant. In the end, they expected to
produce a great car, whatever the intermediate measurements predicted.
Unfortunately, these attitudes about metrics were never explicitly talked about.
If metrics like the Quality Operating
Systems (QOS) are necessary to ensure
that all the programs develop a
disciplined level of quality performance
and predictability, what is the best way
to apply those metrics to programs like
Epsilon, which are innovating new ways
of articulating measurements?
If process innovations in technical areas
initially involve behavioral changes,
how would a system of quantitative
metrics capture and reflect these
innovations?
If the measurements don't reflect the
effect of the innovations, does that mean
they are not effective?
Program Manager: We-brought the Vice
President in early in the program. In
our very first meeting with him, we
down-played all the normal predictor
charts. We talked for two hours about
all the processes that we were putting
in. We told them that we were meeting
all our indicators, and everything else
was on time and under control.
But when we left the meeting he
reportedly said to [the program
manager's boss' predecessor] that he
was worried about us. We were doing all
this soft stuff and we were going to
lose control of the hardware. We were
not going to deliver the hardware.
When I heard about that from [the
program manager's boss' predecessor], I
didn't feel threatened by it. I was
disappointed. Isn't it unfortunate, I
thought, that he can't understand what
all this means. But we would show them;
we wouldn't lose track of anything.
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This problem came to a head around "change requests" or "concerns." (At AutoCo
the two terms are synonymous.) Concerns are documentation of issues, problems
and impending changes on a part. They include lists of associated parts that might
be affected by changes in the original part.
Back in 1992, the core team had determined through systems analysis (see system
map in Sidebar: The core team's view of "parts behind schedule" on page 14) that
engineers were slow in reporting concerns because of the unwritten expectation that
they should resolve concerns shortly after they were logged. The Epsilon Program
Managers decided that it was better to have engineers report concerns as soon as
they knew there was a change in a part, and not punish engineers who reported
concerns that they could not close out quickly. This would allow better coordination
among changes in parts and lower overall costs because fewer late tooling changes
would be required.
This account of how change requests
were traditionally used and perceived by
engineers and managers, and then the
change in the ways in which the Epsilon
team used the change requests and
associated reporting system, illustrates
the influence of reward systems on
behaviors.
Engineer: The change request (CR)
account reached 500 because we were all
encouraged to bring our issues out and
to stop keeping them on the hidden log
that every engineer has. In the past,
engineers would keep a hidden log of
their problems until they knew the
answer. Then they'd put them on the CR
with an answer at the same time. To say
we were not rewarded for revealing CRs
would be an under-statement. Typically
more than one person would be trying to
solve the same problem. And a lot of
people would do a lot of different
things, not knowing what each other was
doing, because there was no common
document out in the system that tracked
the problem.
I might be working to solve something
and it might involve sheet metal. The
sheet metal people wouldn't know
because I didn't have it on a CR out to
the world. I might not even have known
it effected sheet metal. When I wrote
the CR, they might say: "Wait a minute.
We can't do this. It effects us." If I
had known that a month ago it would
have changed my solution.
A change in the use of a metric, like
change requests, by one group affects the
other groups that use the metric.
Thus, with this process we were
encouraged to get CRs out in the open
sooner. This meant everyone else
understood that you knew what your
problem was and what you and other
people were doing to follow it.
Other programs may require every CR
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Is it required that other groups share the
perception of what a metric means and
how it is used? What does this require
of groups who seek to innovate
processes?
to go through the Program Manager. [The
Program Manager] empowered us to handle
our own problems; if we couldn't handle
them, we brought them to him. But he
didn't need to see them all.
Not only were [the Program Manager]
and [the Launch Manager] strong
proponents of getting the problems out
there on "pink" [the color of the
change request form], but they went to
bat for us. My organization, body
engineering, is very meticulous about
tracking CRs and how long they've been
on pink. We have daily meetings on
this. It can become very punitive when
you have a problem out there for a long
time.
[The Program Manager] and [the Launch
Manager] went to my organization and
said, "Look, we're telling our group to
get the problems out there right away.
That means they're probably gonna be on
pink a little longer." That
circumvented a lot of problems.
Epsilon is "Out of Control !"
At Epsilon, the dilemma about how to use intermediate metrics escalated. This
gradually led to a judgment, by people outside the team, that the program was "out
of control." This was one of several circumstances in which Epsilon managers and
senior managers elsewhere in the corporation held different interpretations of
events.
This comment comes from an interview
conducted at the same time that the "out
of control" perception was brewing, by a
manager outside the Epsilon team.
The information in metrics is used by
many different managers to interpret
how the program is evolving. Given
the changes in how the team used the
metric, what are the implications for
how others use that information?
Job One was not moved back six
months. The car eventually came out on
time, and without the "heroic effort" that
is typically required at the end.
Assembly Launch manager, interviewed
July 1993: In vehicle operations we
have a metric that starts with green
and goes to yellow and goes to red.
Well, I called [a top manager] the
other day and said the Epsilon program
was "purple." "That's the other side of
red [worse]. The other side of red! You
can make all the processes you want,
but there's zero substitute for
experience!"
The Epsilon isn't ready. I've had a
unique ability for the last 10 or 15
years to say what's ready and what
isn't ready and be right 95% of the
time. The patient is terminal. My
recommendation is to move Job One back
six months. If that's not an option,
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then move Job One back six months after
you crash.
What made it difficult for Epsilon
managers to explain their strategy and
behaviors in promoting early reporting
of concerns? Why, after those
explanations, did the top managers
continue to be troubled by the large
number of concerns they saw on
management reports?
What sort of agreement or "buy-in" is
appropriate to askforfrom other
organizations and non-team members
ahead of time in unproven experiments
like this?
If managers from otherfunctions argue
convincingly that a program is in
trouble, is there anything that can be
done, outside of "heroic" efforts to bring
the program back on track?
Content leader: Initially, I felt
really good about our CR count. We were
using the Engineering Release computer
system, which made it much easier to
write a change request.
Since these were pre-release CRs,
management wasn't following them. There
was no threat to engineers. It was
fantastic to find out about all these
things and have them documented, and
then have them sent over to car
management people and designers. We
knew that they were being worked on,
and we could manage them daily right
there in the Engineering Release
system.
Through his approach to change control, the Program Manager let engineers make
their own decisions about what changes should go into the system. He trusted them
to put in only what was important, and interpreted the numbers as an accurate
reading of the state of the vehicle.
It was difficult for the Program Manager to communicate the significance of the
way that Epsilon used the CR system. At a program review meeting in March 1994,
the Program Manager described his approach.
The way the Epsilon team used the
change request metric was the opposite
of the way it had been used by others.
The more change requests on the
system, the earlier they were logged, the
better.
The results from early prototype builds,
and logic behind the way they were
using change requests, seemed to
indicate that the innovation was sound
and successful in achieving results.
Program Manager: In the normal course
of events there are anywhere from fifty
to a hundred and fifty concerns in the
system during a program. We went into
that meeting saying, "We have five
hundred concerns, and that's good.
We've encouraged engineers to tell us
when they have a problem, as soon as
they have a problem. Based on the
measurements we were using, we've had
the best quality evaluation prototype
that we've ever had in our history, so
we were able to do concerns that
involved fit and finish earlier than in
the past. We're closing concerns early
enough so that they're still in design
without affecting hard tools. They're
costing thousands of dollars to close
instead of millions."
I went through our accomplishments
at the meeting. We had an exceptional
MP [mechanical prototype build] and EP
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[evaluation prototype build]. We met
our quality goals, and we had the
highest number to date for MRD
[delivery at Material Requirement
Date]. By encouraging engineers to
write concerns," I said, We're
actually getting work done earlier and
we'll have a better quality product.
This is a change in our system and we
want to keep it that way. We want it to
be-not punitive for an engineer to
write a concern early."
[The Vice President] nodded and
listened. But after the meeting he
still said the program was out of
control.
Vice President's perspective on the same
incident is at right. To him, the Epsilon
project was not "out of control": it was
simply going through the normal
expansion and retraction of changes.
This description of how the change
request system was used illustrates the
expected behavior of program managers
- to perform managerial tasks so that
the change request system follows a
predictable pattern.
Vice President: I wouldn't have found
the change request situation to be that
unusual. It wasn't too different from
Kappa [another program]. The Epsilon
program was not out of control in my
view. Nor did I find the experience of
working them back down to near zero
again any different from what the Kappa
team wanted to do.
The ethic that everybody was trying
to follow was: There is a right time
for change and there is a wrong time.
You ought to be following a curve where
changes get less numerous as you get
closer to Job One. Before every
milestone, such as a prototype build,
you're bound to have many changes where
people rush to get things in to make a
prototype date. One of the biggest
problems that any Program Manager has
is to get hidden changes and problems
out of engineers' desks onto the top of
the table, so you can get them resolved
and closed. That pushes the number up.
Then you just have to hammer them
back down again. This would have been
eight months before Job One. At that
time, from a manufacturing standpoint,
the engineer's job is done. Now let us
do our job in manufacturing, and you
keep the product stable - which means
no changes. Let us optimize the product
and process so we have a quality
launch. That's the way it's supposed to
work. It never does work that way. The
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When would the Epsilon program
eventually have to succumb to pressures
to get the number of CRs lower? With
what consequence?
engineers keep changing things, most of
the time for good and relevant reasons.
Manufacturing drives some changes. And
so you have this constant battle of
late failures, problems, fits, and
finishes. There is huge pressure from
Assembly to drive the change count
down.
Freezing and reducing the change requests
In March, 1994, under pressure over the high number of change requests, the
Program Manager and the Launch Manager instituted a change in procedures.
Engineers were told to stop everything else and resolve changes. During an
intensive weekend, the engineers reduced the number of open CRs from 350 to 50.
At the time, this enhanced the program's reputation. For example, at least one
senior Assembly manager gave the team a lot of kudos for driving the changes
down to a lower level. In his eyes, a program that had been a disaster now inspired
confidence - the metrics were what they were expected to be and the Program
Manager had demonstrated that he was in firm control.
Ironically, however, the appearance of solving problems early may have
contributed to an outbreak of late-breaking problems when changes that had been
"pushed underground" resurfaced later in the game.
In physics there is a law which specifies
that any action is met by an equal and
opposite reaction. Does this law from
the physical sciences also apply to the
behavioral arena of managerial action?
What is the reaction to pressures to
reduce CRs?
Content leader: But when management
takes that approach you drive your
engineers underground. Nobody will
write a CR that they don't have a
solution for if they know that their
supervisor has been told to come to
them three times a week to ask them
about their open CRs. The engineer
won't tell me about it. Thus, after we
got through the VP build it reverted
back to the old "hidden" system.
Program Manager: Instead of calling
them concerns from then on, we called
them investigation issues or some other
name so we could identify what the
concerns were. That's better than
nothing. But that's not what you really
want.
What you really want is for everyone
to know that there was an issue. Once
the whole company system knows a
concern exists and it's a problem, they
can all think about, "Now, how might
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that affect me?" Everybody can work on
it together.
I even went back to [the Vice
President] and said, "The magic of this
system is we capture everything, I mean
everybody knows about it from the day
we capture it." He thought that sounded
terrific, but he still didn't like open
concerns!
The early retirement
AutoCo announced major organizational structure changes in April of 1994. These
changes were part of efforts to become better at managing in a global marketplace.
One effect of these changes, as they began to be implemented in the summer of
1994, was that many (approximately one third) middle managers no longer had
positions. In August, the Program Manager was informed he would not be
promoted, and he was given an option of taking another assignment at the same
pay, or early retirement. He chose to take retirement. The Launch Manager faced a
similar situation and chose the same option several months later.
When executives were asked, they said that these events had nothing to do with
reactions to Epsilon's achievements, and nothing to do with the perceived
effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the MIT learning efforts. However, the early
retirement options occurred around the same time that the Epsilon project was
garnering notice in the press. The Program Manager and the Launch Manager had
begun to give speeches about the process, both inside AutoCo (as part of the
activities promoting the car to dealers) and outside AutoCo (often at MIT-sponsored
events).
The early retirement was taken by many on the team as a signal, albeit
unintentional, that the Epsilon effort, and its process innovations, had not been
valued as much as team members hoped. Epsilon team members struggled to
understand what it would mean to their future. Other people in AutoCo began to
wonder if the Epsilon team performance had been as high as the hype suggested.
And there was general confusion about how much AutoCo could learn from the
Epsilon experience. In hindsight, the timing of the reorganization sent signals
which senior managers wish had been interpreted differently.
Program Manager: I never expected to be
offered early retirement. I still
expected that, after seeing the
hardware results we got, they'd see
that we did something special. When
[Vice President] called me over for a
one-on-one meeting, I thought I was
Is it possible to go through a significant going to get promoted. Instead, he gave
change effort, in which you come to me a brief presentation, told me I
believe you are special because of your would be demoted [sic], and handed me a
achievements, and still keep the
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perspective of the traditional
organization? In this case, does success
simply means, "You 've done your job?"
Once given the opportunity to speak and
act freely, will people assume that a
continued atmosphere of trust and
openness will protect them? Will they
grow accustomed to speaking and acting
freely even in other environments and
circumstances at AutoCo? Will they be
frustrated if theyfeel they cannot speak
and actfreely ?
Senior executives confirmed, in
interviews, that they supported the
"learning organization" efforts. Why,
then, did their actions present another
picture to Epsilon team members?
One hypothesis suggests that the lack of
time spent by top managers and Epsilon
Program Managers in trying to
understand each other was afactor. The
misperceptions built on each other and
rippled out to other participants in the
AutoCo system, both inside and outside
the team.
retirement package for consideration.
I honestly don't think there were
any ulterior motives. They simply
didn't regard what we did as so
special. They had to reduce the total
number of people at my level. They
wanted engineers in the program manager
roles. I'm not an engineer. I don't
think they thought about it as a
terrible thing, or even as hurting my
ego. They created a formula and then
carried it out. They just didn't think
we did anything much different from
what any other team does.
Content leader (interviewed September,
1994): I'm not sure that we are coping
with it very well. There are a lot of
morale problems right now. We were so
proud of what we had been able to
accomplish, and then to get slapped in
the face like this. It was like every
one of us got fired. We feel
unappreciated and totally demoralized.
Yeah, we were extremely successful. We
made a lot of breakthroughs. We had
tremendous success in just about every
measurable you want to throw up. Then
to be told that "You really didn't do
anything special at all. Oh, and
incidentally, we're getting rid of your
Program Manager," was a terrible
experience.
Vice President: I think the team spirit
witnessed itself in a negative fashion
once it was clear that [the Program
Manager] was going to retire. The team
reacted not as individuals, but as a
unified group. Individuals were not
incensed; the whole team was very
upset.
A lot of people associate some of
the disadvantages that the people on
the Epsilon team went through with the
MIT organizational learning experience.
That is absolutely wrong. The
perception is not correct, and we ought
to correct it.
Program Managers' boss: But we haven't
done anything to correct it. All we did
was take the top guy and hammer him.
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That's what people see, and they
believe what they want to believe.
I think we have taken a major step
backwards from showing the people out
there that we support improving our
processes. They are all scared to
death. When the reorganization started
I argued that we ought to take some
overt action to support organizational
learning. Because we have a lot of
people who are unsure whether they
ought to be involved in any of this
kind of stuff.
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the influence of innovation
Vice President: If the MIT course is
something that everyone should be
following, then I think not only I, but
each of the vehicle center people ought
to go through it. And we at [the top
management staff level] ought to adopt
it as the process that we want to
follow for human interaction and team
building.
With all the different consultants and
approaches used in an organization, how
do top managers most effectively learn
to evaluate them?
Does the anecdotal datafrom the Epsilon
team mean that organizational earning
will be effective in other circumstances?
Others on the team weren't convinced
that the "learning organization" approach
made a critical difference. It was
experimental, not that clearly explained,
and there were concerns that it could be
But if it's equivalent to other
approaches, and there are 40 different
ways to achieve the same results, then
it's not so important that we choose
that specific course. I don't know
which is the right one. That's the
confusion factor.
Program Manager (interviewed October,
1993): We'd like to get the kinds of
things we're learning to spread in the
company. We're showing some of the new
Program Managers what we've done and
the results that come from it. We're
saying, I know this works. It has
worked for us. It has changed our
teams. I have lots of hard data and war
stories from different people." I don't
know really what to do to spread this
any further, but I know if I could it
would be an extremely valuable tool for
the AutoCo.
Launch Manager (interviewed in April,
1993): Maybe if the Epsilon were
successful, there would be more open
minds about the approach. But my great
fear is: Others may not have the
patience, inclinations and discipline
to go through what we did. They'll
expect a two-day learning lab to
produce a miracle. They'll see no
miracles, so they'll say, That stuff
doesn't work," and go back to the old
ways.
Process leader: We haven't made a
strong enough case of the benefits to
cause anybody to say, "Let's do this on
every team." Worse still, they don't
understand that "doing this" means
developing your own systemic
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in the end: Assessing
reproduced in other teams.
As they reflected on the program,
corporate executives recognized the
conditions that Epsilon was saddled with
at the beginning. In the complex
business of developing vehicles, it is
difficult to separate the effects of initial
conditions from the benefits of an
innovative process.
It is difficultfor top managers to
compare qualitative results from one
program to another. They see the overt
behaviors of the team. But the way that
Program Managers are asked to report
their progress and results makes it
difficult to assess if an innovative
process had any impact.
understanding, commitment, and in-depth
reflection. They see "doing this" as:
"Okay, you guys have tested it. Now we
can go train everybody." So, we have
not done a credible job of presenting
the learning process.
Program Manager's boss: I spent quite a
bit of time with the Epsilon program
team. I was able to watch their
progress versus the progress of the
other programs for which I was
responsible. I saw a measurable
difference in the way the Epsilon team
went about their business, and the way
they reached closure on issues. The
interaction of all the cross-functional
participants on the team was much more
supportive, much less confrontational,
and much more focused than it was on
the other programs.
I guess I didn't see the same kind
of chemistry relationship on [other
successful programs such as] the Kappa.
Kappa had excitement and cohesiveness,
because everyone rallied around the
product, and it is a great product. It
was more difficult for [Program
Manager] to rally people around their
product. Yet I didn't see the same type
of positive relationships within the
Kappa team. As far as I'm concerned, it
is important for us to have those kinds
of relationships on every launch team.
Vice President: If you look back at the
history of the team, they went through
some periods where they went over cost.
As a team they pulled it back to
objective and in the end they've even
beaten their objectives. [the Program
Manager] went through some very
positive sessions with suppliers to
make sure that each supplier knew what
he had to do, specifically when he had
to deliver it, and at what quality
level. He literally took 500 people in
massive meetings and made sure each and
every person understood it. That
represents involvement of the people
you depend most on.
Whether all this is Senge, or
whether it sprang from the MIT
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experience, I don't know. But I think
you could only do that if you operate
as a very strong team.
The final situation of the Epsilon vehicle development effort and associated learning
program leaves open many questions. Can a company, through a learning process,
ask people to change their attitudes? What does real learning require? If it involves
personal and internal changes, what is the role of a company and the work
environment in promoting these changes? Can they be legislated? How are
conditions created where people can examine their attitudes and make choices for
themselves and others about their attitudes? Beyond the realm of individual change,
what is needed for an innovative team in terms of support and understanding by the
larger organization? If teams proceed, led by innovative managers, without
establishing an organizational context for their efforts, what consequences might be
anticipated?
One of the organizational consequences for the Epsilon team was that their
accomplishments were not recognized by AutoCo in the way they had anticipated.
What are the implications of organizational consequences for individuals who have
been engaged in a learning process, perhaps undergoing some personal changes,
and then finding themselves, as the project ends and they move into new teams,
back in the more traditional environment?
As the vehicle went on to manufacturing, it experienced what were anticipated
issues in reconciling design versus manufacturing concerns. These issues,
although described at first by some long-standing AutoCo observers as taking place
in an atmosphere of crisis and heroics, were ultimately seen as much less traumatic
than those of most other programs. The initial response from manufacturing was
explained by design engineers as the typical "posturing by Assembly." In the end,
the plant manager commented that Epsilon was "the smoothest launch he has ever
seen," said shortly before he too left AutoCo to retire.
The tangible evidence for a sound design and development process came when the
production began one week earlier than planned. The factory had all the parts at
hand, they were of the expected quality standard, and fit and finish concerns had all
been addressed. The quality (from the syndicated independent research on
competitive new vehicle quality (CNVQ) showed a 30% improvement in quality, a
9% improvement in satisfaction and a 50% improvement in surprise and delight
features. The warranty data was not as good news, as it initially got worse than the
previous car.
Also significant, perhaps, is the fact that organizational learning continues to be
discussed in depth at AutoCo. This report, in fact, was commissioned as an effort
to capture the Epsilon experience - so that the triumphs, along with the questions
and difficulties, would not be lost.
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Epsilon's Noticeable Results, 1991-1994
This list of noticeable results was collected and amended through the learning history
interviewing process. People were asked to comment on items, their significance, and if it
was familiar, describe how it was accomplished and what if any role they and others they
knew had in it. The items in this list are observable events or objective measures which
provide data on Epsilon program progression.
* Mechanical Prototype (MP) build (8/91): The Mechanical Prototype is a
production level prototype for the underbody and front end of the car. The Epsilon MP
design represented a considerable stretch from the previous AutoCo vehicle; it
incorporated multiplex wiring, all new suspension and accommodation for electronic
navigation systems.
In part as a result of earlier delays the MP drawings were sixteen weeks behind, but the
first MP build was completed only four weeks behind the original schedule. The quality
of the MP prototype build and maturity of its design allowed extensive testing to be done
much earlier than is normally possible.
* Team collocation 7 (10/91): Although the Epsilon team had not been designated to be
collocated, program management pushed for it. The Epsilon team collocated 37 months
before Job One (the date when production manufacturing was set to begin).
* Stage 8 Market research clinic (4/92): Forty engineers from the development
teams participated in a market research clinic in California. This was said to be the first
time engineers formally talked directly to customers this early in a vehicle program.
* Harmony buck complete (1/93): The harmony buck is a mechanism to review early
designs and design changes prior to the periodic prototype builds. The harmony buck
was an idea proposed by engineers on the Epsilon team. However, the $2 million cost to
build a harmony buck was not covered in the Epsilon program's budget. Program
management supported the concept and lobbied Senior Management (Vice Presidents) to
gain funding support. AutoCo now uses the harmony buck in other programs.
* Evaluation Prototype (EP) build (4/93): The EP brings all vehicle systems
together, so that integrated testing can occur. The program team completed the first EP
on April 1, 1993, making up for earlier delays and meeting the original program timing
plan. Eighty-five percent of parts were available for the EP build (setting a company
record; other car programs have had between forty and sixty percent of parts available at
this point in their programs).
* Change Requests (CRs) reach 500 (7/93). Change Requests (CRs) are
documents which engineers write to indicate the need for alterations in parts or technical
specifications. CRs indicate that rework is needed; thus, senior management uses the
count of CRs to evaluate program performance at any moment in time. Following the EP
build, the Epsilon had 524 outstanding CRs, ordinarily a sign of very poor performance.
(A more typical number would be 200.) Product development and manufacturing
management said that they had never seen a program recover from such a high level of
CRs.
7 "Colocation" means that people from the diverse engineering functions developing the car (i.e.
chassis design, air conditioning, suspension, alternator, sound systems, dashboard subsystems, etc.)
work from offices in the same location. Team members are physically placed together, during the
time it takes to design the car, instead of coming together only for formally scheduled meetings.
EPSILON Learning History * Noticeable 
Results Page 87
I  earning History - Noticeable Results Page 87
* Validation Prototype (VP) build (10/93): Validation Prototype vehicles are built
to test changes made after the EP build. The VP design was frozen in July of 1993 -
three weeks ahead of plan. Ninety-three percent of the VP parts were on time to the
material requirement date (MRD). According to manufacturing management, the quality
of the VP prototypes was the best any vehicle program had ever accomplished. The
subsequent engineering release (ER) was completed in August of 1993, four weeks
ahead of plan. Ninety-eight percent of the ER parts were delivered one month ahead of
plan, with the other two percent known and accounted for. Four VP prototype vehicles
were built on the regular assembly line at the Mission Hill manufacturing plant.
The new owner vehicle assessment (NOVA) scores for VP were 96, compared to an
average of 108 for other vehicle programs (lower scores mean higher quality ratings).
The NOVA scores for the earlier build had been substantially worse than average; they
were 145, compared to an AutoCo average of 105. Top AutoCo managers made what
were described as uncharacteristic acknowledgments that the Epsilon program was
performing well.
* Accelerated 1PP build (6/94): The 1PP (final) prototype build began one week
early. The team had 70 percent "production status" parts (normally 50 percent). The new
owner vehicle assessment (NOVA) scores for 1PP were 28, a company record. The
previous best NOVA score was 35, and the average score was 55 for other vehicle
programs.
* Job One accelerated by one week (11/94): Production builds began one week
ahead of the scheduled date. Starting production early was previously unheard of, and
thought not feasible given the normal chaos that surrounds a vehicle launch. The
program was able to return an estimated $65 million of the $90 million budgeted for late
changes to parts. Based on the "18 panel" reports submitted at the end of product
development, the Epsilon met or exceeded all forecasted goals (quality, weight, fuel
economy, performance, functional image, customer satisfaction, variable costs,
investment, and vehicle profitability).
* Final quality results: The final Nova C quality assessment for the Epsilon
was 5.8 - significantly lower (better) than the average Nova C assessment for
the last six recent launches (which averaged a score of 9). Subsequent quality
rating by an independent market research organizations (Competitive New
Vehicle Quality) showed a 30% improvement in quality as measured by things
gone wrong, rating AutoCo's Epsilon in second place for automobiles in initial
customer quality.
The noticeable results are measurable and provide firm indication of the Epsilon program's
achievements. These noticeable results were used to focus description and evaluation in
interviews. What transpired so that these results were accomplished, how they were
interpreted, and what they mean has been the subject of this learning history.
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Appendix: Some initial questions for group
discussions prior to moving forward
with learning initiatives
This learning history presents a story of what happened in the Epsilon Program. It
also provides a context for considering important issues which surface as business
organizations undertake explicit learning efforts. Provided below are four
questions applicable to what happened with Epsilon, which can also be taken as a
starting point for management teams considering either leading or supporting
process innovation efforts:
* How have the approaches taken by the Epsilon team added value to the
traditional product development process? Can whatever value-added there
was be recognized and accounted for by existing vehicle program metrics?
* Which methods and techniques used by this team can be transferred and
used by other program teams? How do these tools get used to provide early
improvement results ("quick hits")?
* Which methods and techniques require longer term investments to produce
improved results? How does the value-added of "quick hits" compare with
those produced by longer term investments?
* What action steps and resource commitments are necessary to achieve visible
improvement results on both a quick and a long-term basis in other parts of large
organizations?
EPSILON Learning History * Appendix: Initial questions 
Page 89
PSI  Learning History - Appendix: Initial questions Page 89
EPSILON Learning History * Appendix: Initial questions · Page 90
